PM Lee Hsien Loong at the IISS Shangri-La Dialogue 2019

Please scroll down for the Chinese translation of the speech.

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Dr John Chipman, Director-General and Chief Executive, IISS
Your Excellencies
Distinguished guests, ladies and gentlemen,
Good evening

Welcome to Singapore and to the 18th edition of the Shangri-La Dialogue.

The view from Singapore and Southeast Asia

Our world is at a turning point. Globalisation is under siege. Tensions between the US and China are growing. Like everyone else, we in Singapore are anxious. We wonder what the future holds, and how countries can collectively find a way forward to maintain peace and prosperity in the world.

What can the history of Southeast Asia tell us about avoiding upheavals and disasters in our path ahead? This year, Singapore is commemorating our Bicentennial. 200 years ago, Stamford Raffles, an Englishman, landed in Singapore and founded a trading post here. The Dutch had already colonised the Dutch East Indies, so the British were actually latecomers to Southeast Asia. Raffles was Lieutenant-Governor of Bencoolen, on the west coast of Sumatra. He saw the trade potential of the region, and decided to look for a new outpost for the British East India Company along the Straits of Malacca. He chose Singapore, and that changed our destiny.

The Dutch protested Raffles’ action furiously, but in vain. To preserve their monopoly, the Dutch had either prohibited foreign ships from operating in their ports, or imposed high tariffs. Raffles took a different approach. He set up Singapore as a free port. Trade boomed, and the settlement prospered. The more open approach of the British delivered superior results.

Over the next century, Southeast Asia was divided between the British, Dutch, Spanish, French, and later the Americans. Their rivalry was intense. No single colonial power dominated the whole region.

In the 20th century, the interests of big powers continued to intersect in Southeast Asia. In 1941, Imperial Japan invaded French Indochina. The US retaliated with an oil embargo on Japan. This was the immediate trigger for the Pacific War. On the same day that Japan bombed Pearl Harbour, they also attacked Malaya and Singapore. There followed for us the Japanese Occupation: three years and eight months of oppression, fear, and misery.

During the Cold War, Southeast Asia was again on the frontline. The region was split between communist and non-communist states. Vietnam became the battlefield for a proxy war between the two camps. Meanwhile, China supported communist insurgencies and promoted armed revolution in the non-communist countries, including Malaysia and Singapore.

This was the backdrop when the five non-communist countries in Southeast Asia – Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand – came together to form ASEAN in 1967. It was a remarkable act of statesmanship. Several of the partners had a recent history of conflict with one another, and the wounds had yet to heal fully. But with ASEAN, the five countries eschewed conflict, and took the path of dialogue, cooperation and friendship. We integrated into the world economy, linked up with advanced countries, and thrived. Meanwhile, the communist countries in Indochina were held back for decades by successive wars and the rigidity of their command economies.

After the Cold War ended, the US became the sole superpower. Southeast Asia entered a new phase. The Indochinese wars finally ended, and the communist countries opened up. Earlier, Vietnam had invaded Cambodia, thus posing a serious threat to its non-communist neighbours. But now Vietnam joined ASEAN, together with Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar. It was a case of beating swords into ploughshares.

Over the next decades, Southeast Asia benefited from a favourable external environment. The US was the dominant power in the Asia Pacific, and a stabilising security presence. International trade was expanding rapidly. Trade barriers came down, often led by the United States. The ASEAN economies prospered through export-led growth and foreign investments. International frameworks like the World Trade Organisation (WTO) and the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) established rules, managed conflict, balanced competing interests, and fostered cooperation between countries big and small. Initially China played only a minor economic role, but as its economy took off, it became a growing partner of the ASEAN countries, and a major participant in regional affairs.

US-China relations

I recount this history to show that Southeast Asia is no stranger to the great game of nations, and to offer some historical perspective on the current strategic situation. The US-China bilateral relationship is the most important in the world today. How the two work out their tensions and frictions will define the international environment for decades to come.

The relationship has already altered significantly. China has totally changed since it started opening up forty years ago. Its GDP per capita has grown by more than 25 times in real terms. China is now the second largest economy in the world.

On many counts, China’s growth is a tremendous boon, both to itself and the world. China has substantially transformed its backward, centrally-planned economy into a middle-income, market-driven one, even though it is still far from being a full market economy. More than 850 million Chinese people have been lifted out of poverty, an achievement unprecedented in human history.

China’s development and success has benefited the world too. China has become a massive production and manufacturing base, lowering costs for the world’s producers, first for labour-intensive goods, and now increasingly for high value and technology-intensive production. It is also a huge market, importing everything from commodities and electronic components to aircraft and fine wines. On the consumer side, billions of people worldwide buy all manner of products, from Barbie dolls and basketballs to drones and mobile phones, made in China, though often incorporating foreign components and technology.

Imagine, conversely, had China remained closed and undeveloped. A failing China would have exported many problems to the world, quite possibly still including armed revolution. Its huge population would have been resentful and restless at being left behind by other countries. A generation ago, when China was still poor, Deng Xiaoping was asked by US President Jimmy Carter to allow more people to emigrate. He answered: “Well, Mr President, how many Chinese nationals do you want? Ten million? Twenty million? Thirty million?”

China’s success has enabled the world to avoid this disastrous outcome. At the same time, China’s growth has shifted the strategic balance and the economic centre of gravity of the world, and the shift continues.

Both China and the rest of the world have to adapt to this new reality. China has to recognize that it is in a totally new situation created by its own success. China can no longer expect to be treated the same way as in the past when it was much smaller and weaker. China may still be decades away from becoming a fully developed advanced country, but it cannot wait decades before taking on larger responsibilities.

Having gained much from the international system, China now has a substantial stake in upholding it, and making the system work for the global community. Chinese leaders have spoken up strongly in support of globalisation and a rules-based international order.  China must now convince other countries through its actions that it does not take a transactional and mercantilist approach, but rather an enlightened and inclusive view of its long term interests.

For example, when China joined the WTO in 2001, its merchandise trade accounted for only 4.0% of world trade. Since then China’s share has almost tripled, to 11.8%. This is why the trade arrangements and concessions that China negotiated when it joined the WTO are no longer politically wearable for other countries. It is in China’s own interest to prevent the international framework of trade from breaking down, and to implement timely changes that bring about greater reciprocity and parity with its trading partners, and that are more consistent with present day China’s more advanced state of development.

Similarly, in security, now that China is a major power with the second largest defence budget in the world, its words and actions are seen differently. To protect its territories and trade routes, it is natural that China would want to develop modern and capable armed forces, and aspire to become not just a continental power but also a maritime power. At the same time, to grow its international influence beyond hard power, military strength, China needs to wield this strength with restraint and legitimacy.

Frictions will arise between China and other countries from time to time. The overlapping maritime claims in the South China Sea are one example. China should resolve these disputes peacefully, in accordance with international law, including UNCLOS. It should do so through diplomacy and compromise rather than force or the threat of force, while giving weight to the core interests and rights of other countries. Then over time it will build its reputation as a responsible and benevolent power that need not be feared. Instead China will be respected as a power that can be relied on to support a stable and peaceful region. In the long term, this will allow China to continue to benefit from a conducive and friendly international environment, and enhance its influence and standing in the world.  

The rest of the world too has to adjust to a larger role for China. Countries have to accept that China will continue to grow and strengthen, and that it is neither possible nor wise for them to prevent this from happening. China will have its own legitimate interests and ambitions, including to develop indigenously advanced technologies like infocomms and artificial intelligence. As a major stakeholder in the international system, China should be encouraged to play commensurate and constructive roles in supranational institutions like the IMF, World Bank, and WTO. If China cannot do so, it will create its own alternatives.

The United States, being the preeminent power, has the most difficult adjustment to make. But however difficult the task, it is well worth the US forging a new understanding that will integrate China’s aspirations within the current system of rules and norms. New international rules need to be made in many areas, including trade and intellectual property, cybersecurity and social media. China will expect a say in this process, because it sees the present rules as having been created in the past without its participation. This is an entirely reasonable expectation.

The bottomline is that the US and China need to work together, and with other countries too, to bring the global system up to date, and to not upend the system. To succeed in this, each must understand the other’s point of view, and reconcile each other’s interests.

Meanwhile, stresses and strains have built up between the two over multiple issues including cyber-espionage, 5G technology, freedom of navigation, human rights, and especially trade, where the two countries have reached an impasse.

If both sides treat their trade dispute purely on its own merits, I have no doubt their trade negotiators, who are highly competent, will be able to resolve it. But if either side uses trade rules to keep the other down, or one side comes to the conclusion that the other is trying to do this, then the dispute will not be resolved, and the consequences will be far graver than a loss of GDP. The broader bilateral relationship will be contaminated. Other areas will inevitably be affected, including investments, technology, and people-to-people relations. Every action taken by one side will be seen as a direct challenge to the other, and will elicit a counter-action. We will all be headed for a more divided and troubled world.

Hardening of attitudes in the US and China

Worryingly, this is starting to happen. Attitudes on both sides have been hardening. The US National Security Strategy and National Defense Strategy documents describe China as a “revisionist power” and America’s “strategic competitor”. The recent Presidential Executive Order on securing the information and communications technology and services supply chain, states that it is aimed at “foreign adversaries”. It stopped just short of naming any particular country, but made quite clear what actions the US intends to take.

There is a growing bipartisan consensus in the US: that China has taken advantage of the US for far too long; that China has overtaken, or will soon overtake, the US in areas of advanced technology, such as artificial intelligence and some aspects of military technology, through underhand means; that instead of opening up and becoming more like the US, China has regressed in terms of political openness, and hence represents a challenge to American values and leadership.

Americans now talk openly of containing China, and to do so soon before it is too late, the way they used to talk about the USSR and the Soviet bloc. This negative view of China has permeated the US establishment. It is not confined to the White House or the Administration, but is shared widely by Congress, the military, the media, academics and NGOs too. Those inclined to a more positive view of China have been marginalised.

Even US business sentiment towards China has soured. American businesses used to be the strongest supporters of China, because they benefited directly from China’s growth and economic opportunities. They had strongly advocated China’s accession to the WTO. When protectionist or nativist sentiments built up in the US, they were a balancing voice that counselled good relations with China.

Now, that goodwill has all but evaporated. US businesses feel let down that China has not adjusted its policies on trade and investments, and in fact systematically disadvantages foreign businesses operating in China, while Chinese businesses operate uninhibited in the US. They want greater access to the China market, and not just to use China for their global supply chains. This loss of goodwill on the part of an important constituency is a serious problem for China, which the Chinese have not fully appreciated or dealt with.

In China, views are hardening too. There are those who see the US as trying to thwart China’s legitimate ambitions – convinced that no matter what they do or concede on individual issues, the US will never be satisfied. They are alarmed by talk of a “clash of civilisations” between the US and China. They reject what they see as efforts by the US to impose its political system and political values on China.

This is coupled with a strong vein of nationalist fervour. Chinese television is rebroadcasting old movies of the Korean War, known in Chinese as 抗美援朝战争 which means the war to resist America and assist North Korea. There is even a “US trade war song” circulating on the internet, based on the theme music from a popular 1960s war movie about fighting the Japanese in the Sino-Japanese War! Hardly anyone in China, whether in government, academia or the media, can be found who is prepared to speak up for a more positive and benign interpretation of the US’ intent.

The fundamental problem between the US and China is a mutual lack of strategic trust. This bodes ill for any compromise or peaceful accommodation. But to go down the present path would be a serious mistake on both sides. There is no strategic inevitability about a US-China face-off. But at the same time, if such a face-off does happen, it will be nothing like the Cold War.

First, there is no irreconcilable ideological divide between the US and China. China may be communist in political structure, but it has adopted market principles in many areas. The Soviets sought to overturn the world order. But China has benefited from, and by and large worked within, the framework of existing multilateral institutions. During the Cold War, the Communist bloc sought to export Communism to the world. But China today is not attempting to turn other countries Communist. Indeed, it is often criticised for being too willing to do business with countries and leaders regardless of their reputation or standing, citing non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries.

Second, China has extensive economic and trade links with the rest of the world. It is a major node in the world economy, unlike the USSR, whose economic links outside the Soviet bloc were negligible. In fact, all of the US’ allies in Asia, including Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, Thailand and Australia, as well as many of its friends and partners, including Singapore, have China as their largest trading partner. They all hope that the US and China will resolve their differences. They want to be friends with both: to nurture security and economic ties with the US, as they grow their business links with China. In a new Cold War, there can be no clear division between friend and foe. Nor is it possible to create NATO or Warsaw Pact equivalents with a hard line drawn through Asia, or drawn down the middle of the Pacific Ocean.

On the other hand, if there is indeed a conflict between the US and China, where will it end? The Cold War ended with the total collapse of the sclerotic planned economies of the Soviet Union and the Eastern European countries, under the pressure of enormous defence spending. Even then, it took 40 years. It is highly improbable that the vigorous Chinese economy will collapse in the same way.

China cannot take down the US either. The US is still by far the strongest country in the world. Its economy remains the most innovative and powerful, and its military capabilities and spending far exceed China’s. Americans worry about China catching up with the US, but although China may be abreast or even ahead in some fields, it will be many years before China can equal the US. And contrary to what some people in China think, the US is not a declining power, nor is it withdrawing from the world. In fact, the US has made clear its intention to compete robustly, though in a different mode than before.

Even short of outright conflict, a prolonged period of tension and uncertainty would be extremely damaging. Many serious international problems like the Korean situation, nuclear non-proliferation, and climate change cannot be tackled without the full participation of the US and China, together with other countries. In economic terms the loss will be not just a percentage point or two of world GDP, but the huge benefits of globalised markets and production chains, and the sharing of knowledge and breakthroughs that enable all countries to progress faster together.

We should therefore do our utmost to avoid going down the path of conflict, and causing enmity on both sides that will last for generations. Of course, it is the duty of security and defence establishments to think the unthinkable, and plan for worst case scenarios. But it is the responsibility of political leaders to find solutions to head off these extreme outcomes.

This is hard, because leaders on both sides are facing powerful domestic pressures. In the US, the political mood is deeply divided and disgruntled. Large segments of American society have lost confidence in globalisation and multilateralism. According to a Pew survey last year, nearly half of all Americans have an unfavourable opinion of China. As the presidential elections approach, these attitudes will surely deepen, because neither the Republicans nor the Democrats will want to risk being accused of being ‘soft’ on China. Regardless whether President Trump is re-elected, or another Republican or Democrat wins, these sentiments will not go away.

China may not have US-style presidential elections, but their leaders face strong internal pressures too. In fact, the orientation of the Chinese leadership is primarily domestic. They know they have major issues to deal with at home. These include unevenly distributed growth, significant rural poverty, an aging population, and rising expectations for a better quality of life.

Both sides are sensitive about being perceived as weak. Out of political necessity, the US wants to show that it has come out ahead in any deal. On the other side, because of China’s long history with the West, its leaders cannot afford to appear to succumb to Western pressure to accept an “unequal” treaty. Just a few weeks ago, China commemorated the centennial of the May 4 movement. Not all of you may be familiar with it but it is an important date in Chinese history. In 1919, at the Versailles Peace Conference, a feeble China was forced to accept the decisions of the big powers. This caused Peking University students to demonstrate in protest, launching a nationalist movement to modernise and revive the country. This was a seminal moment in modern Chinese history.

This zero-sum dynamic makes it very hard to construct an agreement that is politically acceptable to both parties. But ultimately it is in the interests of both the US and China to reach such an accommodation, and to persuade their domestic publics to accept it. They both need to keep their relationship steady, so that both can focus on their respective pressing domestic priorities, and not be distracted by troubled relations with the other.

Multilateralism

What can other countries do collectively, to stem the growing hostility and instability? Small states like Singapore can do little to influence the big powers, but we are not entirely without agency.

There are many opportunities for smaller countries to work together to deepen economic cooperation, strengthen regional integration, and build up multilateral institutions. This way, we can strengthen our influence as a group, and advance a collective position on issues that matter to us, be they trade, security or technology.

Our multilateral institutions today are far from perfect. The WTO is one of the major institutions in the post-war global order, but now it is almost paralysed, and urgently needs reform. Multilateral global deals like the Uruguay Round are no longer practical, when agreement requires a full consensus among 164 member countries of hugely diverse interests and philosophies. Furthermore, the WTO was designed for an agricultural and manufacturing-based world economy, but the world has moved on to services and now increasingly digital and intellectual property, which need much more complicated rules.

The US has lost faith in the WTO. It often acts unilaterally, imposing tariffs and trade sanctions outside WTO rules. It prefers negotiating bilateral deals one on one against smaller countries in trials of strength. It gives more weight to the US’ direct benefits in the disputes at hand, than to its broader interests in upholding the multilateral system. This has caused concern to many of the US’ friends and allies.

Singapore cannot afford to adopt the same point of view. Being small, we are naturally disadvantaged in bilateral negotiations. We need to reform and strengthen multilateral institutions, not cripple or block them. More fundamentally, confining ourselves to a bilateral approach means forgoing win-win opportunities which come from countries working together with more partners. We need to build a broader regional and international architecture of cooperation. When groups of countries deepen their economic cooperation, they will enhance not just their shared prosperity but also their collective security. With more stake in one another’s success, they will have greater incentive to uphold a conducive and peaceful international order. This will benefit many countries big and small.

Thus, short of universal trade agreements, we should at least strive for regional or pluri-lateral arrangements. This may be a second best solution, but it is a practical way to incrementally build support for lower trade barriers and higher standards, which can then be adopted by other countries.

This was the rationale behind the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). The US originally came on board the TPP because it saw the strategic benefits, although it ultimately withdrew. Fortunately, the remaining 11 members were able to preserve nearly all that had been negotiated, and so the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) is now in force.

I am glad that more countries have expressed interest to join the CPTPP, including South Korea, Thailand and the UK. China is also watching the CPTPP carefully. They are not ready to join now, but I hope that they will seriously consider doing so sometime in the future. Similarly, I hope one day it will become politically possible for a US administration to rethink the US’ position, and recognise that it stands to gain, economically and strategically, from becoming a member of the partnership that it played a leading role in designing.

Meanwhile, countries in the Asia Pacific are working on the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP). The RCEP has a different footprint from the CPTPP. It covers all the key countries on the western side of the Pacific, including Northeast Asia and Southeast Asia, and also importantly India, Australia and New Zealand. This inclusive configuration minimises the risk of the RCEP being misperceived as a bloc that excludes the US and its friends. With such a wide range of participants, RCEP standards are naturally less ambitious than the CPTPP’s, and the deal is also much harder to negotiate. Nonetheless, I hope the participants can take the final step to complete the RCEP by this year, or if not, as soon as the election schedules of the key players allow.

Of course, regional cooperation goes beyond trade. In Southeast Asia, ASEAN has provided ten very different countries an effective platform for dialogue and cooperation. ASEAN has deepened ties and kept the peace amongst its members. It has become an effective regional partner of other countries, and enabled its members to project a stronger external presence as a group.

ASEAN works on the basis of consensus. It makes more progress in some areas than others, because ASEAN members are not immune to the strategic forces which pull us in different directions. This is the hard reality of cooperation in a region exposed to multiple external influences. Despite its limitations, ASEAN has contributed much to the well-being of its members and the security of the region, and ASEAN’s partners recognise the value of ASEAN Centrality.

Amid the geopolitical shifts, new concepts and platforms for regional cooperation have emerged, notably China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Singapore supports the BRI. We see it as a constructive mechanism for China to be positively engaged with the region and beyond. That is why we are active participants. For example, we work with the World Bank to promote financial and infrastructure connectivity, and we provide supporting professional and legal services to BRI countries. We are also partnering China to develop the New International Land-Sea Trade Corridor, which connects Western China to Southeast Asia under the China-Singapore (Chongqing) Connectivity Initiative (CCI-ILSTC).

Of course the substance of the BRI, and the way in which the BRI is implemented, are very important. The specific projects must be economically sound and commercially viable, and must bring long term benefits to its partners. This has not always been the case; some BRI projects have run into significant problems. Overall, the BRI must be open and inclusive, and must not turn the region into a closed bloc centred on a single major economy. As Asian countries deepen their links with China, they also need to grow their ties with the US, Europe, Japan and others. In other words, the BRI should help China to integrate with the world. The end result should be to strengthen globalisation, and not to divide the world into rival spheres of influence.

I believe China appreciates this. At the recent Belt and Road Forum in Beijing, Chinese leaders stated clearly that the BRI would be “open, green and clean”. China’s Finance Minister set out debt sustainability requirements for Belt and Road projects, which the IMF has welcomed. In the nature of such reassurances, the test will be how these statements of intent are implemented in practice, but these are steps in the right direction.

Meanwhile, other initiatives have been proposed for regional cooperation. For example, several countries have proposed various concepts of “Indo-Pacific cooperation”. These ideas are less fully elaborated or implemented than the BRI, but Singapore’s attitude towards them is consistent. We support regional cooperation initiatives which are open and inclusive platforms for countries to cooperate constructively, and deepen regional integration. These initiatives should strengthen existing cooperation arrangements centred on ASEAN. They should not undermine them, create rival blocs, deepen fault lines or force countries to take sides. They should help bring countries together, rather than split them apart.

Conclusion

US-China relations will define the tenor of international relations for years to come. It is natural that the two powers will vie for power and influence, but competition should not inevitably lead to conflict. We hope the US and China find a constructive way forward, competing certainly, but at the same time cooperating on major issues of mutual interest.

Some people argue that compromise is not possible or perhaps not even desirable, because the US and China hold such different values. Indeed, one US official recently defined the clash with China as “a fight with a really different civilisation and a different ideology”. Others observe that the US is a young country that wants everyone to be like them, while China is an old country that believes no one else can be like them.

To expect every country to adopt the same cultural values and political system is neither reasonable nor realistic. In fact, humankind’s diversity is its strength. There is much we can learn from one another, from the differences in our values, perspectives, systems, and policies. The story of humankind’s progress has been one of exchange of ideas, and continuous learning and adaptation.

Henry Kissinger said last year that “we are in a very, very grave period for the world”. No one can predict which way events will develop. At different times in the last two centuries, Southeast Asia has seen rivalry between great powers. It has experienced destruction and suffering from war and occupation. It has been divided into opposing camps. It has seen how isolation from the world economy led to stagnation and sometimes conflict. At other times, it has benefited from international cooperation that created an open, stable environment where countries could prosper in peace. 

On a long view, we cannot rule out any of these eventualities. But in our own generation, we must work together to maximise the chances that countries will have the wisdom and courage to make the right choices, opt for openness and integration, peace and cooperation, and so preserve and expand the progress which we have made together.

Thank you very much.

 

 

Chinese translation

国际战略研究所所长约翰.奇普曼博士阁下
各位阁下
各位嘉宾，女士们、先生们
大家晚上好！

欢迎各位来到新加坡并出席第 18 届香格里拉对话会。

新加坡和东南亚的视角

世界正处于一个转折点。全球化受到多方的抨击，美国和中国的关系日益紧张。新加坡和许多其他国家一样，非常担心这样的趋势。我们既不知道形势会如何发展，也不晓得世界各国是否能够携手开辟新的出路，一同维护世界和平与繁荣。

我们是否能从东南亚历史中得到启示，在求取进步的道路上避开过去的动乱与灾难？今年是新加坡开埠 200 周年。200 年前，英国人史丹福.莱佛士登陆新加坡，并在这里设立了贸易站。当时，荷兰人已经对东印度群岛进行殖民统治。比起其他欧洲国家，英国人到东南亚寻求发展相对较晚。莱佛士当时是明古连（位于苏门答腊西岸）副总督。 他意识到这个地区的巨大贸易潜力，因此决定在马六甲海峡沿岸寻找新的地点，为英国东印度公司设立贸易站。于是，他选择了新加坡，而这也改变了我们的命运。

荷兰人强烈抗议莱佛士的举动，但徒劳无功。为了保护其垄断地位，荷兰人禁止其它国家的船只在荷兰管辖的港口运行，或向这些船只征收昂贵的关税。莱佛士采取了不同的管理方式。他在新加坡设立了自由贸易港。贸易和人口迅速增长，显示了英国所采取的较开放贸易政策，更具成效。

在之后的一个世纪，东南亚由英国、荷兰、西班牙和法国分治，美国之后也在东南亚进行殖民统治。殖民强国之间的竞争非常激烈，但没有一个国家能在整个区域中占主导地位。

到了二十世纪，列强仍在东南亚为各自的利益展开争夺。1941年，日本帝国侵略了法属中南半岛。美国向日本进行反击，禁止向日本出口石油。 这引爆了太平洋战争。日本轰炸美国珍珠港当天，也进攻马来亚和新加坡。新加坡被日本占领，在长达三年零八个月的日据时期里，人民饱受压迫，在恐惧中度过了苦难岁月。

到了冷战时期，东南亚再次成为战争前线。这个区域被划分成共产主义与非共产主义国家。共产主义和非共产主义之间的代理战争也随后在越南展开。同时，中国在东南亚各地，包括马来亚和新加坡等非共产主义国家，支持当地共产党的革命行动，提倡武装起义。

这局势促使了五个非共产主义国家，即印度尼西亚、马来西亚、菲律宾、新加坡和泰国，在 1967 年成立亚细安（中国称“东盟”）。这是个非凡的成就，也体现了五国领导人的政治家风范。当时，这五个国家之间仍存有不少记忆犹新的纠纷与冲突，伤痕也未完全愈合。然而，它们愿意冰释前嫌、放下矛盾，朝亚细安共同体的方向迈进，展开了对话与合作，并建立友谊。它们一起融入世界经济，与先进国家发展贸易关系，经济也随着繁荣起来。至于位处中南半岛的共产主义国家，它们受到持续战乱和计划经济的牵制，发展步伐较为缓慢。

冷战结束后，美国成为了当时世界唯一的超级强国，东南亚也进入新的发展阶段。随着中南半岛战争的结束，共产主义国家也逐渐对外开放。 越南之前入侵柬埔寨，因此对邻近非共产国家的安全构成严重威胁。但最后，越南、老挝、柬埔寨和缅甸还是加入了亚细安。大家化干戈为玉帛，共同谋求发展。

接下来数十年里，稳定的外部环境为东南亚的发展提供了良好条件。另一方面，美国在亚太地区扮演了主导角色，并在维持区域的稳定和安全方面发挥了作用。随着国际贸易迅速扩张，各国纷纷消除贸易壁垒，而引领者往往是美国。 亚细安各国也通过出口型增长和外来投资取得了蓬勃的发展。世界贸易组织和《联合国海洋法公约》（United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea，简称 UNCLOS）等国际框架制定规则、处理纠纷、平衡相争利益以及促进大小国家之间的合作。起初，中国的经济影响力不大。不过，随着中国的经济开始腾飞，它便逐渐成为亚细安国家重要的经济伙伴，以及区域事务的重要参与者。

中美关系

我重述这段历史，是为了表明大国博弈对东南亚来说并不陌生，并将当下的战略局势和历史背景联系起来。中美关系是现今世界最重要的双边关系，两国如何处理彼此的紧张关系和摩擦将决定整个国际 环境的未来走向。

这几十年来，中美关系已发生了显著的改变。中国自四十年前改革开放以来，已出现巨大变化。今天，中国的实际人均国内生产总值已经增加了 25 倍以上。与此同时，中国也晋升为世界第二大经济体。

从各方面来看，中国的经济增长对中国本身，乃至全世界，都带来巨大好处。中国在很大的程度上已将其中央计划经济转变为中等收入及市场驱动型经济，但离完全的市场经济还有一段距离。此外，中国也成功让超过 8 亿 5000 万中国人脱贫，这样的成就在人类历史上是前所未有的。

中国的发展与成功也让全世界受惠。中国已成为一个庞大的生产和制造基地，为全世界降低了制造成本。中国最初生产的是劳动密集型的产品，现在则逐渐转向生产高价值和技术密集的产品。中国也是一个庞大的市场，因为中国从世界各地进口各种产品，包括商品、电子零件、客机和美酒等。全世界数十亿消费者购买各种中国制造的商品，包括芭比娃娃、篮球、无人机和智能手机，这些商品往往也用到其他国家生产的零件和科技。

相反，假设中国四十年前没有进行改革开放、经济没有增长，中国可能将面对诸多国内问题，其中还可能包括继续输出武装革命。这将在许多方面波及国际社会。 中国成千上万的人民如果意识到自己的国家因为没能跟上全球化的发展而落后于其他国家，必定会感到愤愤不平。 30 年前，中国还是一个贫困国家，邓小平先生出访美国时，时任美国总统吉米·卡特就问他，是否会放宽移民政策，让更多中国人移民。邓小平先生的回复是：“总统先生，您愿意接收多少中国人呢？一千万、两千万、 还是三千万名中国人？”

所幸，中国的成功让世界避开了这个灾难性的结果。中国的增长改变了战略平衡，也转移了世界的经济重心，而这种改变还会持续下去。

中国和其他国家都必须做出调整，适应新局势。中国必须意识到它的成功开创了全新的世界格局，不能期望其他国家继续以扶助弱小国家的方式相待。尽管中国可能还需要几十年才能成为一个真正的发达先进国家，却不能到了几十年后才肩负起更大的国际责任。

中国从国际体系获益良多，因此，维护现有体系，使其顺利运作，造福国际社会，在相当的程度上也符合它自身的利益。中国领导人已站出来强烈表达了对全球化和以规则为基础的国际秩序的支持。现在，它必须通过行动来说服国际社会，在处理双边关系时，中国不会采取重商主义的做法，只把合作看成交易，而是以开明和包容的态度看待其长远利益。

例如，18 年前，中国刚加入世贸组织时，其商品贸易还不到全球贸易的 4%。 时移世易，中国如今的商品贸易已经提升两倍，占全球11.8%。因此，从政治角度来说，其他国家已无法接受中国继续享有在加入世贸组织时所获得的贸易安排和优惠措施。维护国际贸易架构，并对现有的安排作出及时调整，以增进中国和贸易伙伴之间的互惠与平等关系，避免国际贸易体系崩溃瓦解，这些都符合中国的利益，也与它今时今日较为发达的状态相称。

同样的，在国际安全方面，中国既已跻身强国之列，国防预算位列世界第二，其言行就会受到国际社会的关注。为了捍卫领土和贸易路线，中国自然会寻求发展先进和强大的军事实力，不仅要成为陆地强国，也有意建设海洋强国，这些都是可以理解的。与此同时，中国仍须以克制的方式展现实力，并按照国际规范行事，以符合自身的利益。

中国与其他国家之间不时会发生纠纷和摩擦。南中国海主权声索相互重叠就是一例。中国应该按照国际法，包括联合国海洋法公约和平解决这些争端，并通过外交途径达成妥协，而不是诉诸武力或武力威胁，同时正视其它国家的核心利益和权利。久而久之，中国将被视为负责任的仁慈大国， 其他国家不但无需感到畏惧，也会因为仰赖它维护本区域稳定与和平而更尊重中国。长远来看，这将让中国在有利和友善的国际环境中持续发展，并提高中国在世界的影响力和地位。

另一方面，各国也必须适应一个更具影响力的中国。大家必须接受中国会继续壮大的事实，并且了解阻止中国不断强大是不可能的事，更非明智之举。和其他国家一样，中国也拥有合理的利益和期望，包括开发本土的高端科技，如资讯通信和人工智能。作为国际体系的主要利益相关者，中国必须能在国际机构如国际货币基金组织、世界银行和世界贸易组织等，扮演恰如其分和具建设性的角色，否则它会另起炉灶。

作为世界头号强国，美国所必须做的调整最为艰难。无论这项工作有多艰难，如果美国能取得新共识，让中国的期望融入现有的规则和规范体制，这将为两国带来好处。我们必须为多个领域拟定新规则，包括贸易、知识产权、网络安全和社交媒体。中国会希望对这些改变拥有话语权，因为现有的规则是以前拟定的，中国当时没有参与。这是个合理的要求。

最重要的是，美国和中国必须和其他国家合作，共同提升而不是颠覆国际体系。要实现这点，中美两国都必须从对方的角度看待问题，才能更清楚了解彼此应如何协调各自的利益。

可是，现在的情况是，中美关系因为好几个课题而变得更紧张，包括网上间谍活动、第五代网络（5G）科技、自由航行权、人权和已经导致两国陷入僵局的贸易课题。

如果双方把争端纯粹视为贸易问题来处理，我相信它们的贸易谈判代表们将能够解决问题。但是，如果某方想利用贸易规则来打压对方，或认为对方正试图这么做，那么这场纠纷将无法化解，而其后果将远比国内生产总值的损失来得惨重。中美两国的广泛关系将受到严重的打击，其他方面如投资、科技以及两国人民之间的关系也会受到影响。中美两国的一举一动都可能被对方视为挑衅，并促使对方做出反击。如此一来，世界将陷入一个更为分化和不安的局面。

美国和中国态度更为强硬

令人担忧的是，双方的态度确实变得更加强硬。美国近期发布的《战略安全报告》和《国防战略摘要》两份报告，形容中国为“战略竞争对手”与“修正主义大国”。美国总统特朗普近日签署的《确保信息通信技术与服务供应链安全》行政命令，更表明是针对“外国对手”。这项行政命令虽然没有具体点出任何国家，但已清楚显示美国要采取什么行动。

美国共和党和民主党正逐渐达成共识，认为美国长久以来被中国利用；并指责中国通过不正当的手段，在某些先进科技领域如人工智能和部分的国防科技方面迎头赶上，甚至超越美国；以及中国不但没有效仿美国，转向政治开放，反而背道而驰，因此对美国所主导的价值观和其领导地位造成威胁。

美国人如今公开谈论如何遏制中国崛起，如同他们当年对苏联的全方位遏制措施，并希望尽早行动、以免为时太晚。这种对中国的负面看法已经渗透美国的体制。除了特朗普政府，还包括美国国会、军事、媒体、学者、非政府机构等。较折中的观点已被边缘化了。

就连美国企业对中国的看法也恶化了。以往，美国企业是中国最坚定的支持者，因为中国的经济增长所带来的经济机遇让它们直接受益。 它们大力支持中国加入世界贸易组织。当保护主义或本土意识早在美国抬头时，它们愿意为中国说公道话，在提倡中美保持良好关系方面起到正面作用。

但如今，美国企业对中国持有的善意都几乎不复存在。美国企业觉得中国辜负了它们的期望，不但没有调整其经济和投资政策，甚至还系统性地实施对在华营业的美国和外国企业不利的措施，但中国企业却能在美国自由运作。美国企业要求中方给予它们更大的市场准入权，而不仅是将中国当作全球供应链的一部分。许多欧洲企业也有同感。外企作为重要的支持者，对中国已不存善意对中国而言是个严重的问题，中方还未真正意识到这点，或加以应对。

另外，中国人对美方的态度也变得更强硬。有些人认为美国正试图阻挠中国成为世界强国的雄心抱负。他们相信，无论中国做什么，或是在各别课题上做出让步，美国永远都不会满意。他们对中美“文明冲突”的论述感到担忧，也不接受任何他们视为是美国试图将其政治体制和价值观强加于中国的做法。

与此同时，中国国内也掀起了一股激烈的民族主义思潮。中国电视台正重播抗美援朝战争的旧片。最近网络上也流传一首名为“贸易战”的歌曲，其音乐取自上世纪 60 年代抗日战争影片的主题曲。中国方面，无论是政府官员、智囊团或媒体，几乎没有人愿意站出来以一种更正面、更温和的方式来解读美国的意图。

中美之间基本的问题是双方缺乏战略互信，而这不利于双方作出任何让步或和解。如果让这种情形持续下去，对中美双方来说都是严重的错误。中美对峙未必一定发生。不过万一真的发生，后果将和冷战完全不同。

首先，中美之间不存在无法化解的根本意识形态分歧 。虽然中国就政治体制而言是个共产主义国家，但它在很多方面却是采纳资本市场原则。冷战时期，苏联企图颠覆世界秩序。但中国大致上遵循由美国主导、以现有多边机构组成的规则框架，并从中受惠。冷战时期，共产集团试图将共产主义输出到世界各地。但今天的中国并没有试图把其他国家变成共产国家，事实上，中国经常被指过于乐意和一些国家和领袖进行贸易往来，不论他们的名声和地位如何。中国所给予的理由是它不干涉其他国家的内政。

第二，中国与世界各国的经贸联系紧密，是世界经济一大枢纽。苏联对外则采取封闭政策，与苏联集团以外的经济联系微乎其微。 事实上，美国在亚洲的盟友，包括日本、韩国、菲律宾、泰国和澳大利亚，以及包括新加坡在内的许多区域伙伴国，它们的最大贸易伙伴国都是中国。这些国家都希望美国和中国能够化解彼此之间的分歧，同时也希望能继续和两国维持友好关系。这些国家在扩大它们和中国的贸易往来时，也努力加强与美国的安全与经贸关系。如果爆发“新冷战”，朋友与敌人之间的界限将非常模糊。要在亚洲成立相等于北约还是华沙条约组织的军事同盟，把亚洲或是太平洋硬生生分成两半，那是不可能的事。

如果中美两国真的发生冲突，后果会是如何呢？冷战结束时，苏联以及华沙条约组织成员国僵化的计划经济不堪庞大的国防开销所带来的压力，而彻底崩溃。即便如此，整个过程也历时 40 年。我们很难想象蓬勃的中国经济会同样崩溃。

另一方面，中国也无法轻易扳倒美国。到目前为止，美国仍然是世界第一强国，它的经济是世界上最具创新力和最强大的，其军事力量和开支也远远超过中国。美国人担心中国会赶上美国，但尽管中国在一些领域可能领先美国， 中国仍需要很长的时间，才能和美国分庭抗礼。美国也绝非如一些中国人所说的正走向没落，也没有自我封闭。相反，美国很清楚地表明会以不同的方式，全力以赴与其他国家竞争。

中美关系若持续紧张和不明朗，即便最后没有发生严重冲突，也将对全球带来巨大破坏。很多重要的课题如朝鲜半岛局势，核不扩散和气候变化等问题，若没有中美两国和其他国家的全面参与，将难以解决。经济上的损失不只是世界生产总值的一到两个百分点，而是失去全球一体化市场和生产链，以及分享知识和各方面所取得的突破的利益。这些发展都让各国发展更加迅速。

&因此， 我们必须尽最大的能力避免冲突的发生，以免双方产生长久难以根除的敌意。 当然，双方的安全机构和国防部门的职责是考虑所有不可想象的情况，包括最坏的情况，做好准备。不过，政治领袖有责任找出解决方案，避免冲突恶化而导致灾难性的后果。

这相当不容易，因为双方领导都面对不少国内压力。美国方面，政治氛围严重分歧，不满情绪持续上升。美国社会大部分已对全球化和多边主义失去信心。皮尤研究中心（Pew Research Center）去年的调查发现，将近一半的美国人对中国的印象并不好。随着美国大选的脚步逼近，美国民众看待中国的态度肯定会更强烈，因为无论是共和党或是民主党候选人，都不愿意被指对中国的态度有所软化。不论特朗普总统能否连任，或共和党和民主党两党之间鹿死谁手，美国民众这样的情绪都难以改变。

中国虽然没有美国式的总统选举，不过中国领导所面对的内部压力也不少。中方领导注重国情，深刻了解需要着手解决重大国内课题，包括经济增长分配不均、农村贫困问题、人口老化以及民众对于生活品质的要求不断提升。

中美双方领导对于被视为“软弱”都非常敏感。美国出于政治需求，必须让自己在任何谈判中都显得略胜一筹。另一方面，中国由于和西方国家有着相关的历史包袱，其领导人不能被视为向西方屈服，被迫接受新的不平等条约。就在几周前，中国举办了五四运动的百年纪念活动。1919 年，当时羸弱的中国被迫接受其他大国在凡尔赛和平会议提出的条件。这促使北京大学学生发起街头示威和抗议，连带发起了民族主义运动，以实现国家的现代化，从而复兴中国。这是中国现代历史上开创性的时刻。

这样的零和思维导致中美双方难以达成政治协议。然而，归根究底，中国和美国达成某种协议是符合双方利益的做法，因此两国都必须说服自己的人民接受所达成的协议。中美也必须保持双边关系的稳定，以便专注于国内事务，无需为处理双边关系而分心。

多边主义

其他国家要如何共同遏制愈加强烈的敌意，以及愈渐不稳定的局势？诸如新加坡这般的小国能力有限，无法影响大国的决策，但这并不意味着我们完全任人支配。

中小型国家有许多机会合作，深化经济合作关系、推进区域一体化，并建立多边机构。这样一来，小国就可以联合起来，扩大其影响力，在关乎自身的课题上采取共同的立场，包括贸易、安全或科技等方面。

诚然，现今的多边机构仍有许多有待改进的空间。世贸组织虽然是国际系统二战后创建的重要国际机构之一，现在却近乎瘫痪，急需改革。世贸组织成员国之间的利益和理念天差地别，但任何协议却需要所有 164 个成员国完全达成共识，这使得像乌拉圭回合谈判这等全球多边贸易协定变得不切实际。更何况，世贸组织是为以农业和制造业为基础的全球经济而设计的，但现在的全球局势却已不同，主要以服务业为主，数码科技和知识产权也逐渐变得更重要。这意味着我们需要为这些产业制定更复杂的规则。

美国对世贸组织已经失去信心。美国现在经常在世贸组织规则之外，单方面征收关税和实施贸易制裁。美国也偏向于选择双边贸易协定，与比它小的国家进行一对一的谈判。相较于维护多边体制的广泛利益，这个做法更能让美国从纠纷中直接获利。这种美国优先的做法让友国十分担忧。

新加坡不能持有相同的观点。身为小国，新加坡在双边谈判中自然处于较不利的地位。我们需要改革并强化多边体系，而不是削弱或阻碍其发展。更重要的是，如果我们把国与国之间的合作局限在双边合作上，将意味着我们无法享有多边合作所带来的双赢机会。此外，我们也需要建立更广泛的区域甚至是国际合作架构。多个国家共同加深经济合作，不仅能够促进彼此的繁荣，还能加强集体安全。这是因为它们对彼此的成功存在利害关系，使它们更有推动力维护有利和平的国际秩序。这样一来，许多国家无论大小，都能从中受惠。

因此，如果不能推进全球多边贸易协议，我们至少必须继续推进区域或诸边贸易协议。这或许不是最理想的解决方案，但这是务实的做法，让各国能逐步减少贸易壁垒和为协议设定更高的标准，供其他国家采用。

这就是当初我们启动“跨太平洋伙伴关系协定”（简称 TPP）的原因。美国原先参与 TPP 谈判，因为它意识到其中的战略效益，但最终还是退出了。所幸，余下的 11 个成员国继续磋商，并最终保留大部分的内容，形成了目前已生效的“跨太平洋伙伴全面进展协定”（简称 CPTPP）。

好几个国家，包括韩国、泰国和英国都表示有意加入 CPTPP，这让我感到欣慰。中国也正密切关注 CPTPP 的发展。虽然中国目前没有加入的打算，我希望中国有一天会认真考虑加入 CPTPP。同样的，我也希望有朝一日，美国的政治环境能允许美国政府重新考虑美国的立场，并意识到加入 CPTPP 对美国在经济和战略上都有好处。毕竟美国也曾在 TPP（CPTPP 的前身）的筹划过程中扮演重要的角色。

亚太地区国家目前正努力完成区域全面经济伙伴关系协定（简称 RCEP）的谈判。与 CPTPP 不同，RCEP 包括西太平洋区域的主要国家，包括东北亚与东南亚国家，更重要的是，它也纳入了印度，澳大利亚和新西兰。这样的安排将减低 RCEP 被误解为是一个排挤美国和其合作伙伴的集团的风险。由于 RCEP 成员国之间的差异较大，其所设定的目标自然比 CPTPP 低，在磋商的过程中也较难取得共识。尽管如此，我仍希望成员国可以作最后冲刺，在今年内完成 RCEP 的谈判，或者是当主要成员的国内政治局势允许的时候。

当然，区域合作不仅限于贸易合作。例如，东南亚国家所成立的亚细安就为其十个国情各异的成员国提供了有效的交流与合作平台，加深它们之间的关系，并促进各方和平共处。亚细安已经成为其他国家有效的合作伙伴。作为一个群体，它也让成员国施展更大的影响力。

亚细安秉持以共识定决策的原则。它在一些事务上进展顺利，另一些则停滞不前，这是因为亚细安成员国面对了来自各方的战略势力的压力。这是我们需要认清的现实，那就是在区域展开合作，就必须面对各种外部的影响。尽管亚细安存在局限，亚细安还是为成员国的福祉和本区域的安全贡献良多，而亚细安的伙伴国也肯定了“亚细安中心论”（ASEAN centrality）的价值。

随着地缘政治的变化，促成区域合作的新概念和平台也应运而生，最显著的是中国的“一带一路”倡议。新加坡支持“一带一路”，视之为中国积极参与区域和区域以外活动的具有建设性的机制，因此我们也是“一带一路”的积极参与者。例如，我们与世界银行合作，推广金融和基础建设的互联互通，同时也为“一带一路”参与国提供专业和法律服务。新加坡也同中国合作，发展中新（重庆）战略性互联互通示范项目旗下的“国际陆海贸易新通道”，将中国西部与东南亚连接起来。

当然，“一带一路”倡议的实质内容和落实的方式也很重要。个别项目必须具有商业价值并符合经济效益，同时为合作伙伴带来长期利益。可是，并非每个项目都如此顺利，有些项目工程可谓困难重重。整体而言，“一带一路”必须保持开放和具包容性，不能把整个区域变成一个封闭的联盟，只以一个单一主要经济体为中心。亚洲国家在与中国深化联系的同时，也需要与美国、欧洲、日本和其它国家发展友好关系。换言之，“一带一路”应该帮助中国融入世界。最终的成果必须是加强全球化，而不是导致各方势力处于对立状态。

我相信中国意识到这点。不久前，中国领导人在北京举行的第二届“一带一路”国际合作高峰论坛上明确表示，“一带一路”将坚持“开放、绿色、廉洁”的理念。财政部长刘昆也表示，中国将成立“一带一路”债务可持续性分析框架，以防范债务风险，这受到国际货币基金组织的欢迎。因此，接下来的考验在于如何实践这些承诺。不过，肯定的是， 他们正朝正确的方向迈进。

与此同时，有些国家也提出了促进区域合作的其它项目。例如，一些国家就提出各种概念来加强印度 – 太平洋区域合作。比起“一带一路”倡议，这些项目或许还缺少细节，或是还未全面推行，但是新加坡的态度是一以贯之的。我们支持任何开放、具包容性的区域合作项目，因为它们是促进各国有效合作、加深区域一体化的平台。不过，这些项目必须加强而不是破坏以亚细安为中心的现有安排，不应该造成阵营对立、加深矛盾或迫使各国选边站。它们应该团结而不是分化世界。

总结

中美关系将决定国际关系未来的发展。世界两大强国展开权力、势力之争是很自然的，但竞争不该演变成冲突。我们希望中美两国能找到具建设性的合作模式，在竞争的同时，也在各个重要课题上展开合作，共创双赢。

基于中美两国截然不同的价值观，有些人认为两国之间不可能、甚至不应该达成协议。一名美国官员最近就把中美博弈形容为“迥然不同的文明和意识形态之间的斗争”。同时，也有人认为美国是个希望被人人效仿的年轻国家；反之、中国则是个自认无法被模仿的古老国家。

想要世界各国都采纳同样的文化价值观和政治体系不单是强人所难、更是不切实际。事实上，人类的多样性就是它的力量。我们可以从价值观、观点、制度和政策的差异中互相学习。人类能不断进步，就仰赖思想的交流，以及不断地学习和适应。

美国前国务卿基辛格去年曾表示，世界正处于一个非常非常严峻的时期。没有人能够预测事态的发展。上两个世纪，东南亚在不同时期见证了大国之间的抗争。它经历了战火的蹂躏，和被他人占领所带来的破坏和苦难，并被分成对立的阵营。它也亲眼见证，一个国家或区域如果与世界经济隔绝，都将停滞不前，有时候还会引发冲突。另一些时候，它又受益于国际合作，这种合作创造了一个开放、稳定的环境，让各国能够在和平中繁荣昌盛。

长远来说，我们不能排除任何可能发生的情况。不过，我们这一代必须共同努力，才能在最大限度上确保每个国家都会以睿智和勇气作出正确的抉择，并支持经济开放和一体化，同时保存以及扩大我们共同取得的进展。

谢谢