PM Lee Hsien Loong at the Dialogue with the Wall Street Journal Editorial Board (Apr 2022)

PM Lee Hsien Loong: You wanted to talk about three things, so I will cover them briefly and then open it to you. I sent you what I said at the Council on Foreign Relations a few days ago. You may have scanned it. So, I will not cover the same ground, but just to say on Ukraine, for us it is an existential issue. Sovereignty and territorial integrity is not just one of the principles in the UN Charter, but for a small country like us, it is absolutely fundamental. We have stood up for this principle every time the subject has come up in the UN, which it does regularly. Because from time to time, things happen, and the issue has to be addressed.

We have done that going all the way back to Grenada in 1983 when the US invaded, and Cambodia when it was invaded by Vietnam in 1978, and now in the case of Ukraine. Mostly, we have not acted independently of the UN’s decisions, and we follow whatever sanctions or decisions that UNSC comes up with. But from time to time, the UNSC is paralysed, like here. And in this case, it is such a big and egregious violation of international norms that we decided we had to act on our own, UNSC or not. And so, we imposed some sanctions – export controls on materials which can help the Russians in Ukraine, and also restrictions on financial institutions; some of them are proscribed because funds flow is part of the problem.

Ukraine has implications for the way events develop in Asia. Some rash people have talked about a NATO-type situation developing in Asia, but Asia is different. How do we handle it so that in Asia we have the right institutions in the long term, that we are able to develop mutual interest and interdependence across potentially hostile lines and prevent a fracture? It is something which exercises us. In addition, individual countries are calculating their own responses and what Ukraine means for them, in terms of defence capability, nuclear even. In terms of who will come to their help, and what the prospects are of something hotting up, on Taiwan, for example. My own take is that Ukraine does not influence Taiwan’s prospects greatly one way or the other, that has its own dynamics and historical frame, but we can talk about that.

Secondly, on US-China, it is one of the things which will be complicated by Ukraine. America asks why China does not stand with it. You have to be very careful not to define the problem with Ukraine in such a way that automatically, China is already on the wrong side, for example, by making this a battle of democracies against autocracies.

We all have a problem in Ukraine. I think if we talk about sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity, a lot of countries can come along. Even China would not object to that, and would actually privately strongly support that. But if you say it is democracies versus Putin’s autocracy, I think that already is difficult. If you say democracies versus autocracies – plural – that already defines China into the wrong camp, and makes things even more difficult.

And already, things are difficult enough. There is very little trust on both sides. It is not so easy to find the right level empowered to engage so that you can tee up to reach rapprochement to reduce the tensions, gradually to build up trust, and to work towards accommodations which are necessary, if you are going to coexist with them. In a situation where 80 per cent of the relationship is adversarial or conflictual, you cannot really segregate the remaining 20 per cent and say “Here, I would like to win-win, cooperate on pandemics and climate change”, or for that matter, trade.

How to do that is something which should preoccupy the US administration, and I think it does. They know that beyond Ukraine, which is taking up their bandwidth now, Asia is where they have to get their strategy and game plan right.

Thirdly, you asked about US credibility. There are two aspects to this – one is whether people are able to do business with the US, and to rely on the commitments made. And it is at least a complication that arrangements made at one administration may or may not endure into the next. Sometimes, the way to entrench a commitment is to settle it in Congress and have a treaty that is ratified, but if you cannot get it ratified, and the President makes an order, the next President may make a different order, which is what happened on climate change.

It is not a prescription to not do business, but it does make things more complicated. There is some stability and consistency to US positions – sometimes it is good, sometimes it is bad. One stable aspect which I think is unfortunately not helpful is in the bipartisan mood on US-China relations. Whether it is Democrats or Republicans, whether it is on the Hill, in the think tanks or even in the media, a very deep sense has settled in that this is a challenger that is different. And if I do not challenge him now, when do I challenge him? The Biden administration handles foreign policy very differently from the Trump administration, but in terms of this fundamental attitude, I think the shift has not been so great. So, you do have credibility on that count, but I would have much preferred credibility in being able to make a commitment that even if we cannot co-habit, to at least co-exist in this world. It is a co-existence for a very long time, and we do have to work together to make sure that we do not end up causing harm to one another continually.

The other aspect of US credibility is your standing in the world – to be seen to be confident, to be on top of your problems, to be abreast of developments and able to play an active role as a very significant power. You may no longer be the hyper-power, but you will still be close to the biggest economy and one of the most advanced, vibrant and dynamic economies and societies in the world; able to attract talent, able to generate new entrepreneurship, growth, ideas and reinvent yourself. It may be a very painful process, but you can do that.

But that is not a universal perception. There is strong perception in some parts of the world, including in China, quite explicitly – that the East is rising, and the West is declining; that you do not have a bright future because the world is changing too fast for a system like the United States, a democracy with checks and balances.

I do not believe this at all. I know you have a lot of problems and you are very preoccupied with them and you do not see a ready solution to them, but to conclude that this a country with no future is a very, very rash assumption to make. It is a bet which if proven wrong – which is very likely – is going to cost; cost in overly ambitious plans, cost in overly complacent assumptions, cost in being aggressive in ways which are going to cause a problem, not just to the US but with the rest of the world.

But there is not much the US can do about that perception by arguing about it. You can only solve that problem by progressively being seen to overcome your problems. And to be looking outwards and to be playing the part which so many countries in the Asia-Pacific would like you to play. And I hope that you will be able to do that, mid-terms, and Presidential elections notwithstanding. I will stop there so that you can ask questions.

Wall Street Journal: Thank you. That was very helpful and frank. I will just start it off with everybody getting to it. You are a very close watcher of China. And I wondered if you can give us your perspective about where you think the leadership of China, with their attitudes are towards the United States – you suggested there is at least part of the view is that America is in decline but that Xi Jinping is going to consolidate his power for another term, presumably later this year – what do you think his overall strategy is in the Pacific and more broadly?

PM Lee: I think they treat the Pacific, in a way, like a near abroad. It is their region; they have intense interactions with it, and not only in terms of trade. Most countries in the region have China as their biggest trading partner. A lot of the countries invest in China – Singapore certainly does. And increasingly China is investing in these countries too, outbound. And they want friends, and they want influence.

President Xi Jinping has said, although it is several years old, he said it when Obama was President – that the Pacific is big enough for both the US and China. But the question is whether it is big enough for countries to be friends with both, or whether it is big enough to be a split down the middle? China has said they are quite happy to have countries being friends with both, and that they do not approve of closed, exclusive groupings. But at the same time, they say that regional affairs should be resolved by regional countries. But there are some regional issues in which countries which are not within the region have a legitimate interest, for example, freedom of navigation and the stability and security of the region, because these can have global implications. And in that case, in fact other countries will be present and will want to participate. And I think many countries in the Asia-Pacific would like to see that happen as well.

So, if you ask what China would like, I think they would like friends and they would like to make friends and influence people. And they have the resources and the focus, and they do so in many ways. Every country in the region has a broad relationship with China, and would like to take advantage of the opportunities in China to do business with it, but at the same time, they would also like to retain freedom of manoeuvre and agency in a multi-polar world.

WSJ: Two things I am particularly interested in the Pacific, we have been able to have the chance to see in these few years. One, in a broad sense, the COVID-19 experience – how the Chinese view the Americans’ handling of COVID-19 and how we view their handling of COVID-19 are very different kinds of narratives – but from the US perspective, the disease comes from China, the lock-downs were not most successful as we are seeing now, the Sinovac was not the best vaccine. There are very conflicting areas. What is the regional view of China’s handling and response to COVID from the beginning and has that had any lasting effects? That is the first question.

PM Lee: I would say the region is a lot more respectful of what the Chinese did than the Americans are. The US blames it heavily on them that right at the beginning they did not promptly detect, declare and wipe out COVID-19. But within a month they did bring it out in the open and countries scrambled to react. Some responded quickly, while others like the United States regret not reacting faster. But you put a lot of emphasis on that possible mis-handling and non-transparency, and specifically questioning whether the virus escaped from a laboratory.

I am sure that the Chinese could have been more transparent at the beginning and could be more transparent now about what happened at the beginning. But to demand proof that the virus did not come out from a lab, when there is not a lot of basis to suspect that the virus did come out from a lab, if I were a Chinese, I would ask: why should I open my lab just to dispel this unreasonable demand and suspicion? Many other things may go on in the lab which the Chinese legitimately do not want to reveal.

I think in the region, Australia would take the US perspective. Most of the other countries in the region would say well, this has happened, let us deal with the problem where it is now.

As for the course of the pandemic, countries in the region have had our challenges dealing with the virus, but for most of the last two years one place where we could receive visitors from without having to test, quarantine and isolate them stringently has been China. Now it is not clear that that will still be the case, but it has been.

WSJ: Thank you for that. My other one is a bit regional, but as the economic relationship between the US and China changes, as supply chains retreat or as the US pursues more manufacturing. Can you talk a little bit about how you think the changing nature of the trade manufacturing relationship between the US and China might play out across the region for the other countries?

I am specifically also interested in one piece of that, for our perspective, how has the changing climate in Hong Kong affected Singapore, in particular, in terms of western companies. Are you really seeing dramatic movement and people shifting to Singapore, but I would say, the whole footprint in general, in the region as it changes?

PM Lee: I think it is two separate problems. On decoupling, the impact on us depends on how deep it goes. My analogy is that we started off with what was more or less a flat world as Thomas Friedman said. Now, there is a chasm which has opened, a crack, and the crack is propagating. We do not quite know how far the crack will extend and whether it is possible to stop it – all right, this part we agree to stay at arm’s length but in other parts we do business together. I hope it will be possible and we at least still have if not a whole cloth, at least one connected world, and that means you have investments in China, technology in China, production in China and exports and interdependence. And more or less, life can still go on.

Hopefully it is so, although we cannot be absolutely sure about that. If it is so, then I can imagine that we will be talking about partly reshoring, partly making more secure supply chains. Then Southeast Asia can be part of the strategy, which is something we have been promoting for many years. Telling people not to put all their eggs in one basket. That while China is very good for MNCs, we in Southeast Asia are not so bad and perhaps you should put something in this part of the world to hedge your bets.

Some MNCs were starting to do that even before the latest troubles. Partly because as China developed, their wages have gone up, and their competitive position has changed. Vietnam has done it quite well. Indonesia has good potential but they have not gone quite as far. Even Bangladesh was growing its textiles and garments industries.

So, if we preserve one international system, we can still make a living. We will try to enhance our trust indicators and develop our networks. That way, our supply chains can connect and operate, and we will be part of a trusted network, part of the world strategic resilience.

If the crack propagates further than that, and we all decide that we each must have our own national resilience, and everything must come home and iPhones instead of having components from forty different countries must now be 80 per cent made onshore in America, then we are in a completely different world.

Countries accuse China of state intervention, subventions, and distortions. But if you decide that for strategic reasons, you must put a lot of things onshore, then you will in effect be taking similar actions. And then what are the rules?

Up till now, the basic rule is that countries are allowed to deviate from strict free trade and no subsidies, but can do so only within legal limits. The WTO establishes a set of fair trading rules and arbitrates them. But now you are going to go quite a lot further. If it is not going to be the law of the jungle – do or die I must have everything in my country, and I am willing to pay a lot of money to bring the activities here – then we do need new rules as to what is a reasonable and acceptable, what are the limits and how do we agree on them. So that is something we have to work on. Everybody is saying that we must have national resilience but if we all push that without limits then we will end up with law of the jungle again.

Hong Kong is a different problem. Their first and immediate issue, which I think is a short term one, is that the expats there are tired of the COVID-19 restrictions. They cannot travel, they cannot do their business very easily – so what is the point of being there, if you cannot go into China or go into the region? Therefore they want to move. Some of them may want to come to Singapore. We are happy to welcome them, but actually we would be more pleased if they were happy to remain in Hong Kong. It is competition for Singapore, but it will make for a vibrant, dynamic region and Singapore belonging to the region will benefit from that.

The longer-term issue for Hong Kong is after 2019, after the student demonstrations, China changed the rules and made new laws. The environment has changed and now the companies have to decide: in this environment, what business can they do?

They can still do business. A lot of companies are in the mainland, on the other side of one country two systems, doing business quite successfully. But what can they do in Hong Kong which is still unique and valuable and different? And do they need to be in Hong Kong still or can they be elsewhere, where there may be other advantages? It could be that some of them will move. Some may come to Singapore. Some may go elsewhere. We will have to see.

Before reunification, Hong Kong and the mainland started off very different. The hope was that as time passed, they would converge, and in a good way, so that at the end of fifty years, when the one country two systems arrangement ends, it is not such a shock to bring the two together. The mainland would become closer to Hong Kong and Hong Kong would become closer to what it is like on the mainland. This year will be the halfway mark. I believe Hong Kong can still make a living, and more than make a living, even as the environment gradually changes.

WSJ: When you were at the Council on Foreign Relations, you said that you did not think that turning China into a democracy was ever in the cards, nor was it the reason why we brought China into the WTO or engage with China. Then you said that we would do it on our own merits, it has been good for Americans. But it seems to me that the whole idea of engaging with China was to actually bring it towards something more democratic, and even if it was not democratic, that it would be less aggressive and expansionist. That has not happened. It has basically been funding dictatorships like in Cuba, in Venezuela, in this hemisphere, and dictatorships that do a lot of work in destabilising US interests in the region.

Later on in that same remark, you said that what we need to do is bring in China, give it more influence, like with the WTO and the IMF. Why should we do that when China is acting in an aggressive, or passive aggressive way, in our own hemisphere. Basically, helping prop up countries that are engaged in things that are basically totally against our interest, and I am not talking about whether they have democracy or not, but I am talking about issues of stability and national security.

PM Lee: We all have our idea of what is improper interference in other country’s people’s political affairs. And certainly, Singapore takes the view that Singapore’s politics is for Singaporeans, and if you are not Singaporean, you have no business either engaging in it or funding it. I think most countries would think like that too. But it is a fact of life that a lot of countries do try to influence the domestic affairs of other countries. Influence operations happen in a lot of countries in the world.

I would say the counterfactual is, if you did not bring China in and you kept them out of the system – with the objective of making them poorer off and less able to be a destabilising factor in the world – are you sure that this would be less destabilising? The bet was that as China developed, as the population became more affluent, they would grow a middle class, they would develop a vested interest in the status quo and in the international system, because that is the system which they profit from. China needs the international finance system; they own several trillion dollars of US Treasuries. They need the world trade system because they export, they do business around the world. And it is better that they be part of this system than not be part of it.

WSJ: One quick follow up – I accept all that, that is reality. But I am not sure why the US should want to welcome China, for example, into the IMF.

PM Lee: They are already members of the IMF and World Bank.

WSJ: To expand their influence, I guess.

PM Lee: The IMF and the World Bank were set up after World War II at Bretton Woods, at a time when the US was dominant. And they were so set up that basically the IMF had a European Managing Director and the World Bank had as President somebody whom the Americans would approve of, and the voting shares reflected the weight of the economies at that time. The shares have been somewhat modified over time, but only very partially. So, the question is not why you want to give China more influence, but what is the legitimacy of an institution, which was created at a time when the balance of the world economy was quite different, and what is the implication of letting that remain the status quo, when you cannot really prevent the Chinese from being part of the world economy?

You can say, okay, I keep the World Bank like this, I always would like to have a big say on who its President is. The Chinese say, alright I will set up the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). It is not quite the same, but it is another way they can engage. Is it better for the world? Probably it would be even better if all of us were operating within one global framework. But is it possible for us to say, no, you must not do that, that is wrong? The Chinese want to engage, they want to invest and do business, other countries also want to do business with them, this is a mechanism by which they can do so.

Once upon a time it was different. In the 1980s, we had the same conversation about the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the precursor of the WTO, and it was not China, but it was the Soviet Union. They were not members of GATT. GATT had maybe 150 members then, and we had GATT Rounds and each time we made progress, bringing down tariffs and allowing freer trade. And the question was whether or not to bring the Soviet Union into the tent. And at that time the argument was made that it is better to keep them out of the tent, because if they come in, we will have a general gridlock and nothing will be settled, because every argument will become so complicated. But in that case, the Soviet Union was a negligible part of world trade and we could work it like that. But with China being a substantial share of world trade now, if they are out of the tent and not subject to the same rules, I think you will find it more complicated.

WSJ: Also, on the topic on foreign influence, I had seen that Singapore last year passed legislation on foreign influence, and I wondered if you could elaborate specifically on what countries it (Singapore) perceived as being a threat in this way, and what specific conducts or behaviours were the basis of concern?

PM Lee: We are very exposed to the world. First of all, we are multiply connected with multiple terabits of capacity on the Internet. Secondly, Singaporeans all speak English and read English. Thirdly, our population is multi-racial – we have Chinese, we have Indians, we have Malays and sprinklings of others as well. And in every case, we are not like the Japanese. If you are an ethnic Japanese, you probably live in Japan. But there are big populations of Chinese, Malays and Indians elsewhere in the region, and we can never say that these connections are not useful to Singapore, or that these connections do not matter to Singapore.

Therefore, we look very apprehensively at influence operations which have been done on the US, at other countries which have experienced similar problems, sometimes subtle, sometimes blatant, often pervasive, and we ask what reason we have to believe that it will not happen to us. Just look around the world. There are any number of reasons why somebody might want to influence our attitudes and political opinions – either to push us in a certain direction or to cause differences in views amongst our population.

It has happened repeatedly in our modern history. Recently one French think tank did a study about influence operations, and devoted one whole chapter to a case study about Singapore. They saw us as being a target because of ethnic connections, and yet saw how we have been trying to immunise ourselves by building a Singapore identity and standing up differently from other countries with similar ethnic compositions. And they gave some examples of incidents where such things could have happened.

WSJ: We are all obviously trying to guess what is the impact of the war on Ukraine on China’s thinking about Taiwan in particular, (among) other regional issues. I am wondering what impact it is having on your thinking about the strategic arrangements in your region, you and other governments and in particular, what conversations you are having about perhaps strengthening the security architecture of countries in the region related with the United States? You said in your remarks that obviously there is not an Asian NATO and there is not going to be an Asian NATO, but we have heard in other countries in the region – Japan, Korea – that this is perhaps sharpening their sense of the strategic security in the region that should be in Asia. What are your thoughts on that and how is it changing how that may evolve given the challenge that China presents?

PM Lee: All the countries in the region must be calculating what it means for their defence. I said it does not just stop with conventional, but goes on even to nuclear questions, and I was talking about Northeast Asia particularly. Mr Abe has raised the question explicitly which has been just under the surface for some years already. And the South Koreans also have considerable views in favour of developing their own nuclear capability. If that happens in Northeast Asia, I am not sure if that is as far as nuclear proliferation will go.

Then, what about the security architecture? Some of the Asia Pacific countries are allies of the United States, like Japan, South Korea and Australia. Others are not allies of the United States, but we have security cooperation which has gone on for a long time, like Singapore. Singapore even has a special title for our relationship. We are a Major Security Cooperation Partner – it is the only one you have; the others are allies or friends.

Singapore and the US cooperate closely, we think it is good that you are participating in the region, but that does not mean we fight your wars or that we are expecting you to ride to our rescue should something happen to us. There is a certain flexibility to it, I think it is best to keep it like that, because the countries in the region, we are not lined up eyeball to eyeball. I have my friends, you have your friends, and we both have some friends in common, and we both do business with one another, a lot of business with one another. So, what the architecture we want for the region are structures which will bring the region together and make you pause a little bit longer before deciding to go for an extreme solution.

The Chinese engage the region by many economic and other schemes. Singapore has an FTA with them, ASEAN has FTA with them, and now we have formed the RCEP, and China has even applied to join the CPTPP. That started off with a few small partners – Singapore, Brunei, New Zealand and Chile, and then it expanded into the TPP when America got involved, and that changed the game. And we made the argument that this is how America can have one big chip on the table. This is one strategic move which will show that you are in play, deepen your engagement with the region, and give the countries in the region a reason also to say, “I’m standing with the United States”.

But your politics made it impossible, you had to walk away from that, and you left the door open, and somebody else is now knocking on the door. What the CPTPP members are going to do is one question, what the US is going to do is another question. I cannot ask the US to come back through the door because that is not on the cards for your domestic reasons, but you should be present and playing the game, and working towards improving market access and deepening your economic relationship with the region.

The Biden administration understands this. They talk about the IPEF – Indo-Pacific Economic Framework. The difficulty is how to make this framework tilt towards facilitating market access, without needing to get Trade Promotion Authority (TPA) or ratification from Congress. But begin to have that conversation, begin to get countries together on this, and do it in a way which is inclusive, meaning this is not something which is meant to be ‘everyone but China’, this is ‘various countries for the time being not yet including China’. China will not be part of it soon, but one day it can happen.

In the case of the CPTPP, for example, for a long time people did not believe that China would ever want to come into this. And the way that it was negotiated by the US, it was, if I may interpret an intention, specifically to make the rules so strict that it would be difficult for certain other countries to participate. The Chinese watched closely. First, they saw it as a threat; they denounced it as a devious plot. Then, they studied it, and one day, they asked the US at a very senior level “what would you think if we asked to join?” This was some years ago.

And then last year, after you did AUKUS they made their move and said, “I am putting up my hand, can I accede?”. So, they are making these sorts of engagements, and I think to say that the region should reject that, is wrong. It is not just unrealistic, it is wrong. We do want China to engage, but we want to engage it in such a way that it is not the only partner, and we would like the United States, we would like Europe as well. Europe declares that they have got a strategic interest in the Far East. Every now and again, the British sail out their new aircraft carrier, the Queen Elizabeth, to the South China Sea. They have just done that. And every now and again, the French sail out the Charles de Gaulle and before that the Jeanne d’Arc, just show the flag and be present. And we welcome that.

But you want to have an overlapping and constructive engagement in the region, so that you do not have a frontline and the need to say “well, this one is my buffer state”. A few states are a bit like that, like North Korea, and maybe some of the Indo-Chinese countries, not all. But by and large, the countries in the region since the war have been your friends, some of them your allies, and that has not been a threat to anybody and long may that remain so.

WSJ: Mr Prime Minister, you move forward with a certain historical consciousness, I think. You think about the broad meaning of things. The broad historical implications of what is going on. And I wondered as you spoke, you have been Prime Minister since 2004, have you in that time seen or think America changed in some ways, do you think it has a sense of its own historical intentions and do you think they are the right intentions? And in the same sense, Mr Xi of China as a historical figure with certain intentions and meaning. How do you read him? Not things like immediate TPP, but what is his meaning and what does he want, and what is America’s meaning right now and what does it want and what should it want?

PM Lee: For a long time, you not only held yourself out as a city on a hill, but you saw that it was in your interest to be open, to be willing to carry the obligations of being a policeman in the region, and you saw the stability and the prosperity of the region as being a plus to you, a great boon to you. And in fact, it has been, because you have a lot of problems in a lot of parts of the world, but for many decades, the Asia Pacific has not been your hottest potato. In fact, it is a region where you have invested, where your MNCs have profited, your people are there, and many friends are there, who have spent time here, studied here, and developed fondness and links for the US.

Over time, as the balance has shifted, and particularly, as the Chinese have developed, but the other partners too, like South Korea and Southeast Asian countries, a counternarrative has developed in the US, which is “Why should I bear this burden? My share is smaller than it used to be. The others are not as poor as they used to be. And can I not now bear less of the burden, and gain more of the benefit, and you pay more of your bill?”

Certainly, that was the narrative of the previous administration. This administration takes a broader approach towards your friends and partners, but the strategic and economic balance has shifted, and adjustments do need to be made in terms of what the other countries in the region will do.

I think one big part of your mind is on how do you deal with China. You are trying very hard, you understand the stakes, but you find it very hard, if not to have a meeting of minds, at least to start to have a connection, which can help both sides manage this problem and take it forward in a more constructive direction, and to find a partner on the other side who wants to do that, and do it with consistency and predictability over more than one US election term. And that is a big issue for you and for the region. It preoccupies you.

On China’s part, I cannot read Xi’s mind, but I believe he feels a sense of mission. They explicitly use this three-part formulation – stand up, get rich, get strong. 站起来，富起来，强起来. Mao has done站起来 (stand up), Deng has done 富起来 (get rich), and now Xi wants to accomplish 强起来 (get strong). What does it mean, the two-100 years? They have just passed the 100th anniversary of the Communist Party of China, and they have declared an end to extreme poverty in China. And for their next centenary, that is 2049, 100 years of the People’s Republic, they aspire to be a modern, great nation.

And your challenge is, is it possible for you to manage the relationship with China, so that they get there in a way which is constructive and not destabilising to the global system?

In the early 2000s, 20 years ago, they commissioned a study of how great powers rose and fell. The study was reported to the Politburo, and they made a video series out of it – 12 programmes, I think, of all the great powers in history, starting with the Portuguese, and then the Spanish, and they talked about the French and the Soviets, and the United States. And at the end, they brought it all together and drew the lessons which they learnt, which was that all the powers which rose by might of arms eventually ran into trouble, and it has to be done in a more sustainable way. And they broadcast the series domestically. So, it was a very interesting insight into the way they thought of how they would arrive in the world, at that time.

WSJ: Could I ask you to elaborate a little bit on nuclear weapons, because one of the lessons of the Ukraine crisis seems to be that a country that does not have those weapons or gives them up, is vulnerable to invasion, and an aggressor who does have them very much limits its opponents’ freedom of action. There are some who might argue that “I understand the concerns about proliferation, but increased deterrent would be a stabilising force, not a destabilising force.”

PM Lee: If you take literally strategic game theories, then you could make an argument and maybe construct a mathematical proof of that. But in real life a lot of accidents can happen, and people are not necessarily rational even on the most existential things. You do have to ask as the number of players proliferate, are you absolutely sure that all of them understand the nuances of mutual assured destruction (MAD)? I do not think Kim Jong Un is crazy; he certainly does not want to commit suicide. But supposing nuclear weapons proliferate in the Middle East, are you sure that those restraints will apply? And even in Northeast Asia, even with restraints, are you sure that accidents will not happen?

During the Cold War, there were many times when you came far closer than people knew, and closer than you ever wanted to, to catastrophic accidents. During the Cuban Missile Crisis, for one. And not just the overt things like General Curtis Lemay wanting to “nuke them till they glowed, but tense tactical engagements which could have escalated into disastrous exchanges. And you had other incidents, near misses like the Able Archer Exercise in 1983 which could easily have ended up in sudden devastating grief. So, I really do not think proliferation is a good idea, but it will be very hard to prevent. All you can hope to do is to slow it down.

李显龙总理: 你们想谈的三个课题，我会先简单地说一下我的想法，然后再让你们提问。我已把几天前在外交关系协会对话会的内容发给了你们，你们可能已经大略看了。所以，今天我不会重复。不过，有关乌克兰危机可以再说一次我们的立场，对我们来说，这攸关国家存亡。主权和领土完整不仅仅是《联合国宪章》的原则之一，对于我们这样一个小国来说，这是一个不容妥协的根本原则。每当联合国会议讨论这个问题时，我们都坚持这一原则。因为，每隔一段时间，就会发生一些争端，那大家就必须解决这些问题。

这是我们一贯的立场，从1983年美国入侵格林纳达，到1978年越南入侵柬埔寨，再到现在的乌克兰被入侵，始终如此。很多时候，我们会依照联合国决议行事，并遵循联合国安全理事会提出的任何制裁或决定。但是，安理会有时会陷入“瘫痪”，就像现在的情况。俄罗斯入侵乌克兰严重违背了国际准则，无论安理会是否做出决议，我们决定依据原则办事。于是，我们实施了一系列的制裁措施，比如对那些有助俄罗斯伤害乌克兰人的物资实施出口管制，并对各种金融机构采取经济活动管制。其中一些遭禁止，以遏制有利于俄罗斯政府的筹款活动。

乌克兰危机对亚洲各种事态发展带来众多影响。一些轻率之人就谈到亚洲正形成一种类似北约的情况，但亚洲是截然不同的。我们应该如何着手处理，确保亚洲长远下来有良好的机制，使我们能够跨越潜在的敌对立场，致力于谋求共同利益、相互依存和防止分裂？这将是我们面对的一大考验。此外，个别国家正在盘算如何在国防能力，甚至是核能力等方面做出回应，以及乌克兰危机对它们的影响。至于谁会来帮助它们，以及一些日渐升温的事态会如何发展，例如台湾问题。我个人的看法是：乌克兰危机不会给台湾的前景带来太大的影响。台湾问题有它自身的发展动态和历史背景，但我们可以就此进行讨论。

第二，乌克兰危机将许多事情复杂化，包括中美关系。美国问中国为什么不和他们站在同一阵线。我们必须非常小心处理，不要顺理成章地把乌克兰问题定义为中国已经站在错误的一边，让这个问题变成一个民主主义与专制主义之间的斗争。

在乌克兰危机中，我们都无法置身事外。我想，如果涉及主权、独立和领土完整的问题，许多国家都会表示赞同和支持。就连中国也不会反对这一点，事实上他们私下对此坚决支持。但是我认为，你很难就此定义为——这是民主国家与普京独裁政府之间的斗争。或说这是民主国家与多个独裁政府之间的斗争，那就会把中国也归入错的阵营，从而让局势变得愈加复杂。

目前的情况已经十分艰难。双方之间几乎已经完全失去互信，因此很难找到一个合适层面让双方可以沟通，致力于恢复友好关系、缓解紧张局面，逐渐建立互信。如果希望与另一方共存，做出一些妥协是必需的。如果百分之80的关系存有敌意和冲突，那你就无法将其余的百分之20排除在外，然后说“这样，我希望实现互利共赢，并在疫情防控和气候变化方面实现合作”，当然还有贸易方面的合作机会。

要如何做到这些，就需要获得美国政府的关注，我想他们确实有那么做。他们也知道，现在除了全神贯注地处理乌克兰问题，在亚洲区域课题上，他们应该要有正确的战略方针。

第三，你问到了有关美国的信誉问题。这可从两个方面着手——第一，人们是否还能跟美国做生意并相信他们作出的承诺。至少，比较复杂的一点是，一届政府达成的安排有可能会，也可能不会延续到下一届政府。有时，要让一项承诺贯彻落实，需要在国会上获得通过，形成一项条约并正式生效。如果没有正式生效，那么这一届的总统可以签署一项命令，下一届总统就可以签署另一项命令，而这种情况就发生在应对气候变化问题上。

虽然没有规定不能跟美国做生意，但这会让事情变得更复杂。美国立场的稳定与一致性有好有坏。我认为一个稳定但可惜且无益的层面是美国两党对于中美关系的立场。无论是民主党或共和党，无论是在美国国会两院、智库、甚至媒体中，有一个根深蒂固的看法，那就是这个挑战者很不一样。如果现在不挑战他，还要等什么时候呢？拜登政府的外交政策与特朗普政府大不相同，而关于这个问题的基本姿态，我认为并没有多大的改变。所以说，你们在这方面有信誉，但我认为更好的承诺是能保证即使无法共居，至少能在这世上共存。这是长期的共存，双方都需要合作，确保不会一直给彼此造成伤害。
另一个会影响美国可信度的是你们的世界地位。你们充满自信、善于掌控自己的问题、与时并进，并且是一个在世界舞台上举足轻重的强国。你们或许不再是超级强国，但你们依旧是世界上几乎最大的经济体，拥有最先进、最有活力，以及蓬勃发展的经济与社会之一。你们可以吸引人才，可以创造新的企业、促进增长和激发创意，并且改造自己。这可能会是一个相当痛苦的过程，但你们做得到。

但世界对此的看法并不一致。世界某些地方，明确地说包括中国，强烈认为东方正在兴起，西方正在衰落。他们认为美国并没有一个光明的未来，因为对于美国这种权力制衡的民主制度而言，世界的变化太快了。

我完全不相信这种说法。我知道你们面对许多问题，因而无暇他顾，目前也没有解决方法。但如果就此断定美国是个没有未来的国家，将会是一个非常轻率的结论。这是个赌注，若下错，就需要付出代价。而且错的可能性很大。比如要为过于雄伟的计划，过于自满的假设，以及过于强势的行为引发问题而付出代价。这不只会影响美国也会影响世界各地。

但美国想通过争辩来改变这看法也是徒劳无功的。要改变这个问题，就必须让大家看到你们在逐渐解决自己的问题。另外，看看外面的世界，并且扮演亚太地区想要你们扮演的角色。尽管中期选举与总统选举会有所影响，我希望你们可以办到。我先说到这里，接下来让你们提问。

华尔街日报: 谢谢，您的观察/看法很有用也很坦率。我先代表大家向您提问。您密切关注中国局势，所以我想知道你认为中国领导人对美国持有什么态度。您提到了一些人认为美国正在衰落，而习近平正为下届任期（年底开始）巩固权力。你认为他在太平洋地区及其它地区的整体战略是什么？

李总理: 我想他们是把太平洋区域视为所谓的近邻。这是他们的区域；他们与该区域有着密切的互动，而不仅仅在贸易方面。中国也是本区域大多数国家最大的贸易伙伴。许多国家都在中国进行投资，新加坡当然也有，而中国也日益在这些国家进行对外投资。他们想交朋友，也想施展影响力。

虽然已是好几年前的事了，中国国家主席习近平在奥巴马总统任期间就说过─ ─太平洋足够大，容得下中美两国。但问题是，这是否意味它够大，足以让各国与中美两国都建立友好关系？还是认为它够大，两个大国可以将之一分为二？中国曾表示，乐意见到一些国家与中美两国都是友好关系，他们并且不赞成封闭、排他性的群组。但与此同时，他们也表示，区域事务应该由区域内的国家来解决。不过，区域外的国家也在某些具有全球性影响的区域课题上，有合法的利益，比如航行自由和区域稳定与安全等。在这种情况下，其他国家其实也会加入其中，或想要参与。我认为这是许多亚太国家希望看到的。

所以，如果你问中国想要什么，我认为他们想结交朋友和施展影响力。他们有资源、有集中力，也通过很多方式这么做。区域内的每个国家都与中国有着广泛的关系，都希望抓住中国提供的商机，与中国做生意。但同时，大家也希望在多极化的世界里，保有一定的行动自由和自主权。

华尔街日报: 这几年间，我们在太平洋看到了两件事，让我特别感兴趣。广义而言，其一是2019冠状病毒疾病（COVID-19）的经历─ ─ 中国人如何看待美国人处理冠病疫情的方式和我们如何看待他们处理疫情的方式都是截然不同的叙述。但从美国的角度来看，这个疾病源自中国，而且如现在所见，封城锁国不是最好的方法，科兴疫苗也不是最有效的。这些都具有很多争议。我的第一个问题是，区域对中国从一开始对疫情的处理和应对有什么看法，而这是否造成了什么持久性的影响？

李总理: 我认为太平洋区域比美国更尊重中国的做法。美国严厉指责他们一开始没有迅速发现、公布和消灭冠病。但实际上，他们一个月内就公诸于世，各国也争相作出反应。一些国家反应迅速，而另一些国家，如美国，则后悔没有更快地作出反应。你们特别强调的，却是中国当初有可能处理不当以及处理方式不透明，尤其是质疑病毒是否从实验室泄漏。

当然，我想中国人也许可以从一开始就更加透明，而现在也可以更开诚布公地说明当初的状况。但如果我是中国人，被要求证明病毒没有从实验室里泄漏，而这个说法本来就没有太多根据，我会质问：我为何要开放我的实验室，以消除这种不合理的要求和猜疑？在实验室里，可能还有很多其他事物，是中国不愿意透露的，这也合情合理。

在本区域，我认为澳大利亚应该会从美国的角度出发。区域的大多数其他国家都会说，既然情况已经发生，就让我们处理吧。

在疫情期间，本区域各国都面对抗疫的挑战，但在过去两年的大部分时间里，我们不需要严格检测和隔离的其中一组外国游客，就是中国的访客。虽然现在还不清楚接下来是否照旧这样，但一直以来都是如此。

华尔街日报: 谢谢您的答复，我的另一道问题将以区域为切入点。随着中美经济关系产生变化，随着供应链脱钩，或者随着美国更注重制造业，您认为中美制造业贸易在性质上不断地变化，对整个区域的国家来说会产生怎样的影响？

除此之外，我对香港局势不断改变给新加坡带来的影响特别感兴趣，尤其是西方国家公司的反应。是不是真的有大批的人迁移到新加坡，而这转变对整个区域有怎样的影响？

李总理: 我认为这是两个不同的问题。脱钩的问题对我们造成多大的影响取决于它有多严重。让我以托马斯·弗里德曼所说的地球或多或少是平的来做个比喻。现在，这个地球出现了个裂口，一个裂缝，裂缝正在扩大。我们不清楚裂缝将大到什么程度，也不清楚是否有可能阻止情况恶化。好吧，我们同意保持距离，但在其他领域仍一起合作。我希望这是可行的。即使不完整，我们至少还能够保持连接。这意味着你的投资、技术和生产都在中国，也出口到中国，相互依存。或多或少，生活还是可以照常运行。

我们但愿如此，却没有绝对的把握。如果是这样的话，那么我可以想象，有一部分的讨论将会与供应链重塑相关，一部分则是探讨如何构建更稳固的供应链。那么东南亚就可以成为这个战略的一部分，这也是我们多年来一直在推动的。告诉人们不要把所有的鸡蛋放在同一个篮子里。对跨国企业而言，中国虽然非常具吸引力，但东南亚国家也不错，不妨考虑把一部分投资迁至东南亚，以对冲赌注。

一些跨国企业早在最近的棘手问题出现前，就已经开始这么做了。部分原因是随着中国的发展，人们的工资提高了，竞争优势产生变化。越南在这方面做得相当不错。印度尼西亚具备潜力，但还有不少进步空间。就连孟加拉国也在扩大他们的纺织和服装产业。

因此，如果我们维护一个国际体系，我们还是可以维持生计。我们将致力加强我们的信任指标和发展我们的网络。这样一来，我们的供应链可以连接和运作，我们就能成为可信赖网络的一员，成为全球战略韧性的一部分。

如果裂缝进一步扩大，以致我们都得决定，为了各自拥有国家韧性，一切都必须在自己的国家制造。那么，原本由来自40个不同国家的部件所组成的苹果手机，现在80%的部件必须在美国制造，这一来我们就生活在一个截然不同的世界了。

一些国家指责中国进行国家干预、提供津贴和扭曲事实。但如果你出于战略因素而决定把很多活动迁回本国，那么实际上你也是半斤八两。这样还有什么规则可言？

目前为止，基本的原则是各国可在法律允许范围内偏离严格的自由贸易规则，并提供津贴。世贸组织制定了一套公平贸易规则，并进行仲裁。但你还要更深入地看待这个课题。如果不是按照森林法则，也就是说各国不会不惜一切要在本国制造每样东西，不愿意花大笔资金把制造活动迁回本国。那我们就需要制定新规则，决定哪些是合理和可接受的范围，有什么限制以及如何达成共识。这是我们需要做的工作。人人都说必须保持国家韧性，但如果大家都永无止境地追求这个目标，我们将再次陷入森林法则的困境中。

香港则是另一个问题。他们的首要和迫切问题，而我认为是个短期问题，就是当地的外国人已经厌倦了冠病限制措施。他们不能旅行，也不能很便利地做生意。如果你不能进入中国或到本区域，留在香港有什么意思呢？因此，他们想移居他处。他们当中的一些人可能会想来新加坡。我们乐意欢迎他们，但其实如果他们愿意留在香港，我们会更高兴。虽然这会对新加坡带来竞争，但这将使本区域富有活力和朝气蓬勃，而位于本区域的新加坡将从中受益。

对香港而言，更长远的问题是在2019年后，在发生学生示威事件后，中国改变了条例并制定了新法律。环境已有所改变，企业必须决定，在这样的环境中，他们能从事什么生意？

他们还是可以做生意。很多公司在中国大陆，在一国两制的别岸，它们的生意都做得相当成功。但在香港这个仍然独特、有价值和不同的地方，他们可以做些什么呢？他们是否仍须留在香港，还是可以到其他可能有别的优势的地方？他们当中可能有一些人会移居。有些人可能会到新加坡。另一些人可能会到别处。我们拭目以待。

在香港回归中国前，两地的发展起点很不一样。当时的希望是，随着时间的推移，它们会以一种良好的方式趋同，并在50年后，当一国两制的安排结束时，两地的结合不会造成太大的冲击。中国大陆会与香港靠得更近，而香港也会更像中国的情况。今年是香港回归中国25周年，是50年的中间点。我相信即便环境正逐渐改变，香港仍然可以维持生计，不仅仅是挣扎求存而已。

华尔街日报: 您在美国外交关系协会对话会上说您不认为原本的预计是中国会成为一个民主国家，也不认为这是我们促成中国加入世贸组织或和中国接触的原因，而是因为这么做本身有好处，而美国人也因此获益。但在我看来，我们与中国接触其实是要让中国变得更民主，即使中国不是民主国家，至少它不会那么强势或实行扩张主义。这种情况并没有发生。中国基本上一直在资助在西半球，如在古巴和委内瑞拉的独裁政权，而这些独裁政权正大力破坏美国在本区域的利益。

您接着说，我们要做的是把中国带进来，让它能在世贸组织和国际货币基金组织等发挥更大的影响力。我们为什么要在中国以强势和消极对抗的方式在我们所处于的半球行事时这样做呢？基本上，中国所扶持的国家的作为完全违反了我们的利益，我并非讨论它们是否民主，而是讨论与稳定和国家安全有关的课题。

李总理: 对于什么是对他国人民政治事务的不当干预，我们都有自己的看法。当然，新加坡认为新加坡的政治属于新加坡人，如果你不是新加坡人，你就不应该参与或资助我们的政治活动。我想大多数国家也持相同想法。但许多国家确实试图影响他国的内政，这是不争的事实。世界上许多国家都出现这样的干预活动。

反之，如果你不把中国带进来，把他们排除在体制外，目的是让他们变得更穷、更无法成为世界上不稳定因素之一，你确定世界会因此更稳定吗？我们当初的设想是，随着中国的发展，随着中国人口日益富裕，他们将形成中产阶级，他们会在现状和国际体系中有既得利益，因为该体系将让他们获益。中国需要国际金融系统，他们拥有数万亿美元的美国国债。它们需要世界贸易体系，因为它们出口产品，在世界各地都有生意往来。让他们成为这个体系的一分子好过把他们排除在外。

华尔街日报: 我想跟进一下，我同意您的说法，这些都是事实。但我不是很清楚为什么美国会欢迎中国加入国际组织如国际货币基金组织。

李总理: 他们已经是国际货币基金组织和世界银行的成员之一了。

华尔街日报: 我猜想中国是为了扩大他们的影响力吧。

李总理: 国际货币基金组织和世界银行是在二战后于布雷顿森林成立。当时美国在世界处于领导地位。这两个机构成立后，由欧洲人出任国际货币基金组织总裁，并由美国认可的领导人担任世界银行行长。当时，这两个机构的投票权分配反映了各经济体在当时的规模。随着时间的推移，有关权力经历了一些微改。因此，问题不是你为什么要让中国发挥更大影响力，而是这个机构的合法性是否有所改变，尤其是它成立时的经济平衡情况和现在很不同，如果维持现状又会带来什么影响，特别是我们无法避免中国成为世界经济的一部分。

你可以说，好吧，我就让世界银行维持现状，让我能在推选世行行长时有很大的话语权。那中国会说，好吧，我就成立亚洲基础设施投资银行（AIIB）。尽管这是个不同的银行，但它为中国提供另一个与世界接触的管道。这是否对世界更有利？如果我们都在同一个全球框架内运作，那也许会更好。但这是否意味着我们可以说，不行，你不能这么做，这是不对的？中国要和世界建立联系，要投资，要做生意，其他国家也想和他们做生意，而这个体制能让他们这么做。

以前的情况不同。上世纪80年代，我们也曾就世贸组织的前身关税贸易总协定（GATT）展开相同的讨论，但是当时讨论的对象是苏联而不是中国。他们不是关税贸易总协定的成员 。该协定当时有大约150名成员，成员们举行了多轮的关税贸易总协定谈判，每一次都取得进展，成功降低关税并使贸易往来更自由。大家讨论的问题是，是否要让苏联加入协定。当时，各国的论点是最好不要让他们加入，因为如果这么做，每个争论就会变得非常复杂，导致大家陷入僵局，什么也解决不了。不过，当时的情况是，苏联在国际贸易中微不足道，因此我们可以这么做。但现在中国在世界贸易中占了很大的比重，如果他们不在体系内并且无需遵守相同的规则，我想局势会变得更加复杂。

华尔街日报: 在外来影响课题上，我看到新加坡在去年通过了有关外来影响的相关法案。我想请您具体说明一下，在这方面，新加坡视哪些国家为威胁，而哪些具体的举止或行为会引起你们的关注？

李总理: 我们面对来自世界各地的各种影响。首先，我们与庞大的互联网相连接。其次，新加坡人都会说英语，也读懂英文。第三，我们是多元种族国家，有华族、印族、马来族和其他族群。在任何情况下，我们都不像日本人。如果你是日本人，你很有可能在日本生活。但本区域的其他地方有大量的华人、马来人和印度人，我们绝不能说和这些地区保持联系对新加坡没有用处或对新加坡不重要。

因此，看着外来势力如何影响美国，看到其他国家也发生类似事件，有些不明显，有些却十分张扬，并往往无孔不入，这让我们感到非常不安，并自问我们有什么理由相信这样的情况不会发生在新加坡。环顾这世界，人们有各种理由想要影响我们的态度和政治观点，例如把我们推向某个方向，或让我们的人民意见分歧。

这类事件不断在我们现代历史中重演。最近，法国一智库进行了一项有关外来影响的研究，其中有一个章节专门分析新加坡的情况，他们认为新加坡之所以成为外来势力的目标，是因为我国的种族联系，但他们也看到我们如何努力构建新加坡人的身份认同，以防范外国势力的介入，并使新加坡有别于其他多元种族的国家。这些学者也举例说明这些事件如何可能发生。

华尔街日报: 显然地，大家都在猜测乌克兰战争会如何影响区域问题，尤其是中国对台湾的态度。我想知道这会如何影响你对本区域的战略安排以及你们和其他国家领导人的想法，尤其是你们就加强本区域与美国有关的国家安全架构进行了哪些对话？您在讲话中提到，很明显的亚洲没有北约，也不会有亚洲版的北约。不过我们也听说本区域的其他国家，例如日本和韩国认为亚洲应该有这类机制，也许这能加强他们在本区域的战略安全意识。您对此有何看法？面对中国所带来的挑战，这会如何改变和演变？

李总理: 本区域的所有国家肯定会思考这会如何影响它们的国防。我之前说过，除了要防御传统的战役外，各国还要考虑核武问题，尤其是东北亚国家和地区。日本前首相安倍晋三已明确提出这个已经潜伏多年的问题。韩国也认为应该发展本身的核能力。如果这样的情况在东北亚发生，我不确定核武扩散问题的发展只是如此而已。

那么，安全架构呢？一些亚太国家是美国的盟友，例如日本、韩国和澳大利亚。另一些国家如新加坡虽然不是美国的盟友，不过长期以来和美国有进行安全合作。新加坡甚至给我们的关系起了特别的名称 – – 新加坡和美国是“主要安全合作伙伴”，这是个专属新加坡和美国之间的关系，因为其他国家都是美国的盟友或朋友。

新加坡和美国的合作紧密，我们觉得你们参与本区域事务是件好事，但这并不表示我们会参与你们涉入的战争，或在我们出事时会要求你们前来搭救。这其中有一定的伸缩性，我觉得最好是维持现状，因为本区域的国家并非都想和各方对峙。我有我的朋友，你有你的朋友，我们也有一些共同的朋友，我们都有生意往来，而且交易量颇高。因此，我们要为这个区域建立的架构，是能将这个区域凝聚起来、让大家在决定采取极端解决方案前能三思的架构。

中国通过多项经济和其他计划与本区域接触。新加坡与中国有自由贸易协定，亚细安与中国也有自由贸易协定，而现在我们有了区域全面经济伙伴关系协定（RCEP），中国也申请加入跨太平洋伙伴全面进展协定（CPTPP）。该协定一开始是由新加坡、文莱、新西兰和智利等几个国家一同发起，后因美国的加入而扩大成为跨太平洋伙伴关系协定（TPP），并改变了格局。我们提出的论点是，这可让美国拥有一大筹码，也是具战略性的一步，能显示美国正在参与区域内的事务，并可加深美国与本区域各国的接触，让他们有理由说：“我们和美国站在一起。”

然而，你们的国内政治让这一切变得不可能。你们必须离开，也把大门敞开，而现在有别人来敲门。CPTPP成员会怎么做是一回事，美国会怎么做又是另一回事。我不能要求美国重新加入协定，因为你们基于国内原因不太可能这么做，但你们不应该缺席，应该参与其中，致力改善市场准入和深化与本区域的经济关系。

拜登政府明白这一点，并提出了印太经济框架（IPEF），但困难之处是如何在无需获得贸易促进授权（TPA）或国会批准的情况下，让这个框架更有利于改善市场准入。但美国应该开始有这样的对话，并将各国聚集在一起，以包容的方式展开对话，也就是说，这不应是“除了中国以外的所有国家”在对话，而是“暂时有各国参与，但还不包括中国”的对话。中国不会在近期内参与对话，但总有一天会有这个可能。

以CPTPP为例，一直以来人们都不相信中国会愿意加入该协定。美国的谈判方式，如果要我诠释其用意，是要使相关条款变得非常严格，让某些国家难以加入。中国一直在密切留意相关进展。刚开始，他们视该协定为一种威胁，并谴责这是一场狡猾的阴谋。后来，中方研究了协定的条款，并在一个非常高级别的场合问美国：“如果我们要求加入，你们会怎么想？”这是几年前的事了。

去年，在美国成立澳欧美联盟（AUKUS）后，中国问：“我现在举手想加入CPTPP，可以吗？”可见中国正建立这类联系，而如果说本区域应该拒绝这类接触的话，我认为那是不对的。这不仅不现实，而且是错误的。我们确实希望中国能参与本区域的事务，但我们希望中国不会是我们唯一的伙伴，而是希望美国、欧洲也能参与。欧洲宣称他们在远东地区有战略利益，英国不时会派出新型航空母舰伊丽莎白女王号前往南中国海。他们最近才这么做。法国也会不时派出戴高乐号航空母舰，之前则是派出圣女贞德号航空巡洋舰，在本区域亮出法国国旗。我们欢迎这样的交流。

但在本区域的接触应该是重叠和有建设性的，这样才不会有前线，也不需要宣称“这是我的缓冲国”。有些国家如朝鲜就持有一点这样的姿态，有些中南半岛国家也可能是这个样子。但总得来说，自二战以来，本区域国家一直是美国的朋友，有些甚至是盟友，而这并没有对任何国家构成威胁，我希望这种情况能持续下去。

华尔街日报: 总理先生，我一直觉得您是带着某种历史意识向前迈进，总会从广义角度思考事物，例如事物的广泛历史含义。我想了解的是，您自2004年担任总理以来，在发言时是否有观察到或认为美国在某些方面有所改变？美国是否认清本身的历史意图？您认为这些意图是正确的吗？同样的，中国国家主席习近平身为一个抱有一定意图和意义的历史人物，您对他有何看法？我指的不是现在的TPP，而是习近平有何意图，想要的是什么？美国的意图又是什么？美国想要什么，应该要什么？

李总理: 长久以来，美国不仅标榜自己为山巅之城，也意识到开放国家并愿意承担本区域警察的义务对自己有利。你们也认为本区域的稳定和繁荣对美国有利。事实的确如此，因为美国在世界许多其他地方有很多问题要处理，亚太地区多年来都不是美国的烫手山芋。事实上，本区域是美国作出投资以及美国跨国企业获利的地方。美国人民在亚太地区定居，而你们也有许多朋友在本区域。他们在这里生活、学习，对美国产生好感并和美国建立联系。

随着时间的推移，这个平衡出现了变化。随着中国以及韩国和东南亚国家等伙伴国的发展，美国国内也出现了相反的说法，那就是“为什么我要承担这个负担？ 我的份额比以前小了。其他国家已不像以前那么穷了。我现在能否承担较少负担并得到更多好处，而你们可否承担更多你们的支出呢？”

当然，这是上届政府的说法。现任政府对美国的朋友和伙伴采取更广泛的方针，但战略和经济平衡已有所改变。因此美国必须根据区域内其他国家的动作来做调整。

我想你们花费很多精力思考的是，到底要如何应付中国。你们很努力尝试，并明白其中的利害关系，但也觉得很困难。就算不能达成共识，至少也要开始建立联系。这有助于双方处理问题，并朝更有建设性的方向前进，还要找到愿意配合的中方伙伴，让双方的联系在超过一届美国政府的任期仍有连贯性而不会难以预测。这对美国和整个区域来说是一个重要的课题，并让你们无暇他顾。

至于中国方面，我无法知道习近平的想法，但我相信他有一种使命感。他们明确提出“站起来” 、“富起来” 和“强起来”三大目标。毛泽东让中国“站起来”，然后邓小平再让中国“富起来”，现在习近平要让中国“强起来”。那“两个一百年”又是什么？他们刚庆祝了中国共产党成立100周年，宣布中国解决了绝对贫困的问题。他们也立志在下一个百年，也就是2049年中华人民共和国成立100周年那年，成为现代化强国。

因此，你们所面对的挑战是，能否处理好与中国的关系，让中国以有建设性而非破坏全球体系稳定的方式实现目标。

在21世纪初，也就是20年前，他们找人研究大国兴衰的课题，然后将报告提交给了中共中央政治局。他们也以此制作了一部12集的纪录片，介绍了所有大国的历史，先是葡萄牙，然后是西班牙，之后也有提到法国、苏联和美国。最后，他们总结了所有大国的经历并从中汲取教训，即所有靠武力崛起的强国最终都会陷入困境，因此国家必须以更可持续的方式崛起。他们当时也在国内播出了这部纪录片。这让外界从颇有意思的角度，一窥他们当时对中国崛起的设想。

华尔街日报: 我想请你多谈谈核武器的问题，因为我们从乌克兰危机吸取的教训之一似乎是，一个没有核武器或放弃核武器的国家，是很容易被侵略的，而拥有核武器的侵略者，则可以大大限制对手的作战主动权。有些人可能会争辩：“我理解人们对核扩散的担忧，但加强威慑力将起到稳定的作用，而非导致局势不稳定。”

李总理: 如果你是以字面上的意义去理解博弈论，那么你可以提出论点，或许还能用数学来证明你的论点。但在现实生活中，很多意外是有可能发生的，人们也不一定是理智的，即便是牵涉到生死存亡的问题也是如此。你必须要问的是：当拥有核武器的国家越来越多，你能肯定他们都了解相互保证毁灭（MAD）的细微之处吗？我不认为金正恩是疯子。他当然不想自杀，但如果核武器在中东地区扩散，你确定这些限制措施会管用吗？即便是在东北亚，即使有限制，你敢肯定意外就不会发生吗？

在冷战期间，很多时候你们与巨大灾难的距离，比外界所知道的还要近，也比你们所愿意看到的还要近。古巴导弹危机就是一个例子。我指的不只是科提斯·勒梅（Curtis Lemay）将军所说的“把他们炸得浑身发亮”这种公然的表述，而是可能会演变为灾难性交锋的非友善战术性接触。还有一些其他事件也是一触即发，就像1983年的“神箭手”演习，很容易就突然酿成惨剧。所以，我真的不认为核武器扩散是一件好事，但这将很难避免，而我们只能希望速度能拖慢一些。